reductivism

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

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This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading

Multiple Realizability Argument

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Reductivism is the claim that descriptions of the mind should be done away with in favor of descriptions of the brain. The Multiple Realizability Argument rejects reductivism because the same mind-state can be realized by multiple physical states. This video explores exactly what that means and how philosophers argue for it.

NOTES

  • Multiple Realizability Argument
    • realizable- an abstract description is made true by more ordinary objects
    1. Reductivism (reductive physicalism): Psychological categories can and should be replaced by physical categories
    2. So, there is a one-to-one correspondence between psychological categories and physical categories
    3. MRT: A mental state can be "realized by" or made true by more than one physical state
    4. So, there isn't a one-to-one correspondence
    5. So, reductivism is false
    • Identity Theory entails reductivism, so it's false
  • Arguing about MRT
    • A1: biology
      1. Psychological states--minds--are an adaptive advantage
      2. It is likely aliens evolved on other planets
      3. So, it’s likely aliens have minds
      4. If aliens exist, then it's likely they evolved using different stuff
      5. So, it is likely aliens have minds like ours with different physical brains
      • O1: (2) is wild
      • O2: (1) is false
        • Reactions are adaptive advantages, not psychological states
    • A2: AI
      • O1: appeal to the future
      • O2: Chinese room
    • A3: brain plasticity
      • O1: different types of regions in the brain--this isn't possible for the mind
    • A4: conceivable
      • S1: Robots
      • S2: gaseous creatures
      • S3: brain prosthetics
    • O1: not fine grained enough
      • R1: implausible that the brain will match up perfectly like that

 

Further Reading

Identity Theory of Mind

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What if the mind is identical to the brain in the way that water is identical to H2O? Could it be the case that two things that are so conceptually different in reality could be the same?

NOTES

  • contingent identity- two things are conceptually distinct, but actually identical
  • Identity theory = the mind is contingently identical to the brain & is reducible to the brain
    • A1 (J.J.C. Smart): Ockham's razor
      1. The world is consists of physical things
      2. The mind is a different kind of entity
      3. We should avoid positing different kinds of entities
      4. So, we shouldn't posit the mind
      • O1: it would be simpler to deny the existence of the physical instead of the mental
      • O2: simplicity isn't a good test for truth
      • O3: ontological simplicity sacrifices theoretical simplicity
    • A2 (David Lewis): theory model of mind
      1. The mind is a theory to explain behavior
      2. The brain is a theory to explain behavior
      3. Causal completeness principle favors brain theory
        • A1: inductive generalization from past scientific success implies physicalism
          • O1: inductive arguments can't be used to disprove the existence of entities
        • A2: conservation laws of physics
          • O1: hylomorphism doesn't violate conservation laws
          • O2: natural laws are descriptive, not prescriptive
        • A3: methodological presupposition
          • O1: unnecessary presupposition
      4. So, brain theory trumps mind theory
      • O1: the existence of a mind isn't a theory, but a datum of experience

Further Reading

For Smart's use of Ockham's Razor, see his ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ in Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156 (1959)

For Lewis' argument, see ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25 (1966).

For more on George Berkeley's argument for idealism, see his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

For more on David Hume's view of causation, read his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

 

Are thoughts just neurons? Mind→Brain Reduction

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Assume the mind exists: is it anything more than the brain? The brain is responsible for so much in the mind, it’s hard to see how the two are separable. But then again, the brain is a material object—can the mind be material?

NOTES

  • Mind→brain reduction
    • 1. The mind exists
    • 2. But it is nothing more than the brain
  • A1: the brain affects the mind
    • S1: (Phineas Gage) brain affects personality
      • O1: psychological explanations
    • S2: brain affects abilities like language-use
      • O1: affects the mind’s ability to use the brain, not the mind
    • S3: (alcohol) brain induces emotions and experiences
  • O1: your brain doesn’t turn into the thing in your mind
    • 1. assume: The mind is nothing but the brain
    • 2. The brain is material
    • 3. So, the mind is material
    • 4. But, the mind is not material
      • S1: qualities in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can see neon purple, but there is nowhere in your brain that is physically neon purple
      • S2: objects in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can perceive a truck in your mind, but it doesn’t exist in your brain materially
      • S3: we can think about things that aren’t physically present
      • S4: we can think about things that don’t physically exist
    • A possible response to this objection is to adopt property dualism, which we will look at soon