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qualia

Qualia Arguments

June 10, 2021 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Qualia arguments intend to show that the mind must be at least partially immaterial due to our qualitative experiences that can't be identified in the material brain. In this video I review three major kinds--the Bat Argument, Mary the Scientist, and the Zombie Argument--as well as objections to these arguments.

NOTES

Qualia Arguments

  1. Qualia are immaterial mental properties that exist
    • S1: qualia like the experience of echolocation or color are not located in the brain
    • S2: in a different possible world, a physical brain could exist without qualia
  2. Therefore, the mind is an existent immaterial entity
  • O1: reducible
    • S1: water & H2O
    • R1: water is made up of H2O, but neurons aren't made up of qualia
  • O2 (Andrew Melnyk): conceptually distinct descriptions, doesn't prove non-identity
    • S1: amnesiac
    • R1: the point isn't epistemological, but ontological
  • O3 (Daniel Dennett): qualia are confused
    • R1: a confused experience is still experience
  • O4: qualia are theoretically effete in explaining behavior
    • O1: qualia are the data to be explained
  • O5: no one can accurately define qualia
    • R1: mental ostensive definition

A further reply can be given to Objection 1: We initially conceive of H2O apart from water, but with further investigation realize that H2O must be water, so we can't conceive of the two apart from each other. The same strategy won't work for qualia, though, because water is how H2O appears to us vs. how it appears under a microscope. Qualia are not how the brain appears to us, but appearance itself.

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind, James D. Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: materialism, philosophy of mind, qualia

Can we see the mind?

February 3, 2020 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Extreme empiricism claims we shouldn’t believe in what we can’t observe. If the mind is unobservable, should we disbelieve it exists? What if we could see the mind? What would that be like?

NOTES

  • A1: From Extreme Empiricism
    • 1. We should only believe in what is observable (in principle, by our equipment, etc.)
    • 2. The mind is in no way observable
    • ∴3. We shouldn’t believe in the mind
  • Support for premise 2
    • A1: observation requires physicality
      • 1. Perception requires sense organs, a thing to be sensed, and possibly a medium
      • 2. All of these are physical
      • ∴3. No non-physical thing can be observed
      • O1: begs the question that all observation must be like ours
    • A2: the mind is first person
      • O1: mind-vision
        • Camera that can capture 100% of your brain structure and activity in real time
        • Interprets it into what that person is seeing
        • Then projects it onto a screen
        • R1: the mind is never observed; this is just an interpretation of the brain
    • O2: you directly observe your own mind
      • R1: this isn’t shared with others, so we can’t check the veracity
        • O1: content of perception is dubitable, not the existence of the perception
        • O2: in order to get agreement from others, we must rely on our experience of them
        • O3: verification assumes others are having perceptual experience
      • R2: Illusion objection
        • O1: illusion is nothing but psychological state
  • Corollary: The only thing we can be sure exists is the mind
    • The existence of the brain and body assumes the reliability (and therefore existence) of sense perception (i.e., the mind)

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: empiricism, philosophy of mind, qualia