physicalism

The Chinese Room Argument

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Could computers think? Could robots have minds? The Chinese Room Argument, devised by John Searle, is a thought experiment meant to show that computers can't have minds, no matter how good technology gets. The amount of debate this thought experiment has garnered has been enormous, and it has proven to be one of the most fascinating ideas in philosophy. In this video, I explain the Chinese Room Argument and five major replies to it.

NOTES

  • Definitions
    • understands: Whatever it is we're referring to when, before we start doing philosophy and thinking about it, we say "X understands Y"
    • X p-understands Y: "X runs a program that always produces a set of behaviors B we associate with understanding that thing Y"
    • Program- a list of rules for what to do
    • r-understands:
      • 'Understands' includes one or more of the following:
        • Qualitative aspect: A feeling of understanding
        • Conscious aspect: Awareness of understanding and how you are using it
        • Intentional aspect: Content of understanding as we experience it
    • x Ci-understands y: x produces the same behaviors as someone who understands y and this behavior begins with a causal connection from y to x
    • x X-understands y: x has the same complexity as the brain of a person that understands y
  • Strong AI
    1. (Computational theory of mind) Understanding is nothing more than p-understanding
    2. A computer can p-understand (Chinese)
    3. So, a computer can understand (Chinese)
    • O1: The Chinese Room Argument
      1. If (1), then we can't p-understand without understanding
      2. I can p-understand (Chinese) without understanding (Chinese)
        • S1: Chinese Room
          • I don't understand Chinese
          • In the middle of the room is:
            • boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base)
            • a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program)
          • People outside the room send in other Chinese symbols: questions in Chinese (the input)
          • By following the instructions in the program I pass the Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output)
          • I p-understand Chinese
          • So, I p-understand Chinese w/ understanding Chinese, which is (5)
      3. So, ~(1)
      4. The only thing a computer can do is p-understand
      5. So, a computer can't understand
      • R1: Systems Reply
        • I am not the whole system here, but more like the cpu of the computer
        • So, me not understanding is irrelevant
        • The system as a whole understands, and that's what counts
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Argument
          • Memorize the rules, then there's only one physical system
          • R1: Virtual Mind Reply
            • There is a virtual mind working the program
            • O1: there is only one physical system
      • R2: Robot reply
        • Include Ci-understanding
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Use digital readouts of cameras and this satisfies Ci-understanding without true understanding
      • R3: Brain Simulator Reply
        • Make a computer that takes natural-language as inputs and runs a program identical to a human brain that understands Chinese
        • Add X-understanding
        • O1: Supergenius Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Increase complexity of the Chinese Room program too
        • O2 (Searle): the water valve brain
      • R4: Other Minds
        1. We attribute understanding to other people because of their behavior
        2. Robots and aliens share the same behavior
        3. So, we should attribute understanding to robots and aliens
        • N1: this is R-understanding
        • S1: pragmatic reasons
          • O1: anthropomorphizing is useful, but metaphoric
      • R5: Intuition Reply
        1. The Chinese Room Argument is based on intuition
        2. Intuition is unreliable in metaphysics
        3. Computational Theory of Mind has explanatory power
        4. We should believe in things that have the most explanatory power
        5. So, we should trust Computational Theory of Mind over the Chinese Room Argument
        • O1: framing CRA in the first person appeals to observation, not intuition

Further Reading

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

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This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading

Multiple Realizability Argument

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Reductivism is the claim that descriptions of the mind should be done away with in favor of descriptions of the brain. The Multiple Realizability Argument rejects reductivism because the same mind-state can be realized by multiple physical states. This video explores exactly what that means and how philosophers argue for it.

NOTES

  • Multiple Realizability Argument
    • realizable- an abstract description is made true by more ordinary objects
    1. Reductivism (reductive physicalism): Psychological categories can and should be replaced by physical categories
    2. So, there is a one-to-one correspondence between psychological categories and physical categories
    3. MRT: A mental state can be "realized by" or made true by more than one physical state
    4. So, there isn't a one-to-one correspondence
    5. So, reductivism is false
    • Identity Theory entails reductivism, so it's false
  • Arguing about MRT
    • A1: biology
      1. Psychological states--minds--are an adaptive advantage
      2. It is likely aliens evolved on other planets
      3. So, it’s likely aliens have minds
      4. If aliens exist, then it's likely they evolved using different stuff
      5. So, it is likely aliens have minds like ours with different physical brains
      • O1: (2) is wild
      • O2: (1) is false
        • Reactions are adaptive advantages, not psychological states
    • A2: AI
      • O1: appeal to the future
      • O2: Chinese room
    • A3: brain plasticity
      • O1: different types of regions in the brain--this isn't possible for the mind
    • A4: conceivable
      • S1: Robots
      • S2: gaseous creatures
      • S3: brain prosthetics
    • O1: not fine grained enough
      • R1: implausible that the brain will match up perfectly like that

 

Further Reading

Identity Theory of Mind

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What if the mind is identical to the brain in the way that water is identical to H2O? Could it be the case that two things that are so conceptually different in reality could be the same?

NOTES

  • contingent identity- two things are conceptually distinct, but actually identical
  • Identity theory = the mind is contingently identical to the brain & is reducible to the brain
    • A1 (J.J.C. Smart): Ockham's razor
      1. The world is consists of physical things
      2. The mind is a different kind of entity
      3. We should avoid positing different kinds of entities
      4. So, we shouldn't posit the mind
      • O1: it would be simpler to deny the existence of the physical instead of the mental
      • O2: simplicity isn't a good test for truth
      • O3: ontological simplicity sacrifices theoretical simplicity
    • A2 (David Lewis): theory model of mind
      1. The mind is a theory to explain behavior
      2. The brain is a theory to explain behavior
      3. Causal completeness principle favors brain theory
        • A1: inductive generalization from past scientific success implies physicalism
          • O1: inductive arguments can't be used to disprove the existence of entities
        • A2: conservation laws of physics
          • O1: hylomorphism doesn't violate conservation laws
          • O2: natural laws are descriptive, not prescriptive
        • A3: methodological presupposition
          • O1: unnecessary presupposition
      4. So, brain theory trumps mind theory
      • O1: the existence of a mind isn't a theory, but a datum of experience

Further Reading

For Smart's use of Ockham's Razor, see his ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ in Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156 (1959)

For Lewis' argument, see ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25 (1966).

For more on George Berkeley's argument for idealism, see his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

For more on David Hume's view of causation, read his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

 

Could the mental be physical?

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The brain is obviously physical, but what about the mind? It seems like it shouldn't be, but maybe we're just looking at the idea od physical wrong.

NOTES

  • What does 'physical' mean?
    • P1: 'physical' means 'spatial'
      • I.e., extended in space; has a volume
      • O1: photons are physical, but not spatial
    • P2: 'physical' means 'material'
      • I.e., made out of matter
      • O1: energy is physical, but not material
    • P3: 'physical' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of physics'
  • What does 'mental' mean?
    • P1: 'mental' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology'
  • Argument for why the mental can't be physical
    1. Physical things are describable and explainable using the concepts of physics
    2. Mental things are describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology
    3. So, mental things are not physical things
    • O1: the same thing can be described and explained in different ways given the purpose of the scientist
      • S1: biologists and physicists explain and describe the same thing using their own sciences
      • N1: this only proves the mental and physical are not necessarily mutually exclusive, not that the mental is physical
    • O2: four-term fallacy

Further Reading

For more on René Descartes' definition of 'physical' as 'spatial,' read his Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Are thoughts just neurons? Mind→Brain Reduction

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Assume the mind exists: is it anything more than the brain? The brain is responsible for so much in the mind, it’s hard to see how the two are separable. But then again, the brain is a material object—can the mind be material?

NOTES

  • Mind→brain reduction
    • 1. The mind exists
    • 2. But it is nothing more than the brain
  • A1: the brain affects the mind
    • S1: (Phineas Gage) brain affects personality
      • O1: psychological explanations
    • S2: brain affects abilities like language-use
      • O1: affects the mind’s ability to use the brain, not the mind
    • S3: (alcohol) brain induces emotions and experiences
  • O1: your brain doesn’t turn into the thing in your mind
    • 1. assume: The mind is nothing but the brain
    • 2. The brain is material
    • 3. So, the mind is material
    • 4. But, the mind is not material
      • S1: qualities in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can see neon purple, but there is nowhere in your brain that is physically neon purple
      • S2: objects in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can perceive a truck in your mind, but it doesn’t exist in your brain materially
      • S3: we can think about things that aren’t physically present
      • S4: we can think about things that don’t physically exist
    • A possible response to this objection is to adopt property dualism, which we will look at soon

Logical Behaviorism: Is “the mind” just shorthand for behaviors?

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Logical behaviorism is the idea that the mind and all its psychological states are nothing more than the behaviors we associate with them. If this is true, the mind-body problem seems easy to solve, but can behaviors always match up with psychological states? 

NOTES

  • Logical Behaviorism
    • Psychological states are not non-physical entities
    • Psychological states are real
    • Psychological states are just the behaviors we associate with them
      • S1: we ascribe psychological states to others based on their behaviors
      • Radical reduction
        • Psychological states as we think of them don’t really exist
          • Same as eliminitavism
        • But we can use the vocabulary of psychological states to describe behaviors
          • Different from eliminativism
  • O1: psychological states cause behaviors
    • “Debora looks like that because thinks her boyfriend is distracted.”
    • Translation: “Debora looks like that because she looks like that.”
  • O2: multiple psychological states assigned the same behavior
    • Belief and desire are interconnected in a way that behavior can’t account for
    • “Yutaro believes he sees is a pigeon.”
    • ‘believes’ is a psychological state
    • Translation: Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal
    • You can believe this without reaching towards the flying animal
    • Must add: “Yutaro is reaching out to touch the flying animal because he wants to touch a pigeon.”
    • ‘want’ is a psychological state
    • Translation: “Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal because Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal”
  • O3: psychological states are not isomorphic with associated behaviors
    • S1: multiple psychological states assigned to one behavior (belief-desire objection)
    • S2: behavior w/o psychological states (super actors)
    • S3: psychological states w/o behavior (super Spartans)
  • O4: others would have better access to your psychological states than you would

Eliminativism: Is “mind” just a pre-neuroscience word?

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The mind-body problem asks whether or not we have a mind distinct from our brain. Eliminativists argue that the idea of a mind is a pre-scientific entity that has been superseded by neuroscience. In this video, I review the main eliminativist argument and it’s objections.

NOTES

  • Mind-body Problem
    • Brain is material; mind seems immaterial
    • What is really real?
      • The brain only?
      • The mind only?
      • The brain and the mind?
      • Neither?
  • The Eliminativist Argument
    • 1. When belief in an entity is solely the result of a folk theory that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory, you should stop believing in that entity
    • 2. Belief in the mind is the result of a folk theory (folk psychology) that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory (neuroscience)
    • 3. So, we should stop believing the mind exists
    • O1: I posit other minds b/c of direct observation of my own
    • O2: I have direct access to my experiences right now, regardless of whether I posited them as a theory or not
      • R1: you are not having an experience at all; this is just an illusion
        • O1: an illusion is an experience