non-reductivism

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

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This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading

Functionalism

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Functionalism is a view in philosophy of mind that attempts to resolve the Multiple Realizability Theorem with psychological physicalism.

NOTES

Functionalism

  1. Psychological physicalism: In philosophy of mind, only physical things exist
  2. Psychological discourse (terms relating to the mind like "want" or "pain") refer to whatever takes an input and assigns an output
    1. E.g., "I want to surf" refers to whatever in me takes the input "seeing good waves" and assigns the output "go surfing"
    2. E.g., "I am in pain" refers to whatever in me takes the input "gets pinched" and assigns the output "winces and says ouch"
  3. MRT: The same functional organization can be 'realized by' multiple different physical systems
    • functional organization- a complete description of all the input-output assignments done by a "mind"
  4. So, the same mind state can be in very different beings
  5. Psychological discourse covers a wide range of things in a way that physical discourse can't
  6. So, Non-reductivism: Psychological discourse can't be done away with in favor of physical discourse, even though the things mentioned in psychological discourse aren't real
  • O1: the same psychological state can be realized by different functional organizations

Further Reading

Hilary Putnam has a lot of his work on this subject collected in Philosophical Papers volume 2: Mind, Language, and Reality.

Multiple Realizability Argument

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Reductivism is the claim that descriptions of the mind should be done away with in favor of descriptions of the brain. The Multiple Realizability Argument rejects reductivism because the same mind-state can be realized by multiple physical states. This video explores exactly what that means and how philosophers argue for it.

NOTES

  • Multiple Realizability Argument
    • realizable- an abstract description is made true by more ordinary objects
    1. Reductivism (reductive physicalism): Psychological categories can and should be replaced by physical categories
    2. So, there is a one-to-one correspondence between psychological categories and physical categories
    3. MRT: A mental state can be "realized by" or made true by more than one physical state
    4. So, there isn't a one-to-one correspondence
    5. So, reductivism is false
    • Identity Theory entails reductivism, so it's false
  • Arguing about MRT
    • A1: biology
      1. Psychological states--minds--are an adaptive advantage
      2. It is likely aliens evolved on other planets
      3. So, it’s likely aliens have minds
      4. If aliens exist, then it's likely they evolved using different stuff
      5. So, it is likely aliens have minds like ours with different physical brains
      • O1: (2) is wild
      • O2: (1) is false
        • Reactions are adaptive advantages, not psychological states
    • A2: AI
      • O1: appeal to the future
      • O2: Chinese room
    • A3: brain plasticity
      • O1: different types of regions in the brain--this isn't possible for the mind
    • A4: conceivable
      • S1: Robots
      • S2: gaseous creatures
      • S3: brain prosthetics
    • O1: not fine grained enough
      • R1: implausible that the brain will match up perfectly like that

 

Further Reading