The mind-body problem asks whether or not we have a mind distinct from our brain. Eliminativists argue that the idea of a mind is a pre-scientific entity that has been superseded by neuroscience. In this video, I review the main eliminativist argument and it’s objections.
NOTES
- Mind-body Problem
- Brain is material; mind seems immaterial
- What is really real?
- The brain only?
- The mind only?
- The brain and the mind?
- Neither?
- The Eliminativist Argument
- 1. When belief in an entity is solely the result of a folk theory that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory, you should stop believing in that entity
- 2. Belief in the mind is the result of a folk theory (folk psychology) that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory (neuroscience)
- 3. So, we should stop believing the mind exists
- O1: I posit other minds b/c of direct observation of my own
- O2: I have direct access to my experiences right now, regardless of whether I posited them as a theory or not
- R1: you are not having an experience at all; this is just an illusion
- O1: an illusion is an experience
- R1: you are not having an experience at all; this is just an illusion