materialism

Qualia Arguments

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Qualia arguments intend to show that the mind must be at least partially immaterial due to our qualitative experiences that can't be identified in the material brain. In this video I review three major kinds--the Bat Argument, Mary the Scientist, and the Zombie Argument--as well as objections to these arguments.

NOTES

Qualia Arguments

  1. Qualia are immaterial mental properties that exist
    • S1: qualia like the experience of echolocation or color are not located in the brain
    • S2: in a different possible world, a physical brain could exist without qualia
  2. Therefore, the mind is an existent immaterial entity
  • O1: reducible
    • S1: water & H2O
    • R1: water is made up of H2O, but neurons aren't made up of qualia
  • O2 (Andrew Melnyk): conceptually distinct descriptions, doesn't prove non-identity
    • S1: amnesiac
    • R1: the point isn't epistemological, but ontological
  • O3 (Daniel Dennett): qualia are confused
    • R1: a confused experience is still experience
  • O4: qualia are theoretically effete in explaining behavior
    • O1: qualia are the data to be explained
  • O5: no one can accurately define qualia
    • R1: mental ostensive definition

A further reply can be given to Objection 1: We initially conceive of H2O apart from water, but with further investigation realize that H2O must be water, so we can't conceive of the two apart from each other. The same strategy won't work for qualia, though, because water is how H2O appears to us vs. how it appears under a microscope. Qualia are not how the brain appears to us, but appearance itself.

Could the mental be physical?

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The brain is obviously physical, but what about the mind? It seems like it shouldn't be, but maybe we're just looking at the idea od physical wrong.

NOTES

  • What does 'physical' mean?
    • P1: 'physical' means 'spatial'
      • I.e., extended in space; has a volume
      • O1: photons are physical, but not spatial
    • P2: 'physical' means 'material'
      • I.e., made out of matter
      • O1: energy is physical, but not material
    • P3: 'physical' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of physics'
  • What does 'mental' mean?
    • P1: 'mental' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology'
  • Argument for why the mental can't be physical
    1. Physical things are describable and explainable using the concepts of physics
    2. Mental things are describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology
    3. So, mental things are not physical things
    • O1: the same thing can be described and explained in different ways given the purpose of the scientist
      • S1: biologists and physicists explain and describe the same thing using their own sciences
      • N1: this only proves the mental and physical are not necessarily mutually exclusive, not that the mental is physical
    • O2: four-term fallacy

Further Reading

For more on René Descartes' definition of 'physical' as 'spatial,' read his Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Are thoughts just neurons? Mind→Brain Reduction

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Assume the mind exists: is it anything more than the brain? The brain is responsible for so much in the mind, it’s hard to see how the two are separable. But then again, the brain is a material object—can the mind be material?

NOTES

  • Mind→brain reduction
    • 1. The mind exists
    • 2. But it is nothing more than the brain
  • A1: the brain affects the mind
    • S1: (Phineas Gage) brain affects personality
      • O1: psychological explanations
    • S2: brain affects abilities like language-use
      • O1: affects the mind’s ability to use the brain, not the mind
    • S3: (alcohol) brain induces emotions and experiences
  • O1: your brain doesn’t turn into the thing in your mind
    • 1. assume: The mind is nothing but the brain
    • 2. The brain is material
    • 3. So, the mind is material
    • 4. But, the mind is not material
      • S1: qualities in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can see neon purple, but there is nowhere in your brain that is physically neon purple
      • S2: objects in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can perceive a truck in your mind, but it doesn’t exist in your brain materially
      • S3: we can think about things that aren’t physically present
      • S4: we can think about things that don’t physically exist
    • A possible response to this objection is to adopt property dualism, which we will look at soon