Our thoughts are about things, a property we call intentionality. Material objects do not exhibit intentionality. In this video, I consider the possibility that this shows our minds are immaterial.
NOTES
THE INTENTIONALITY ARGUMENT
- Thoughts have intentionality
- Material things don't have intentionality
- So, thoughts are not material things
- O1: causal view of intentionality
- R1: non-existent causes (e.g., unicorn)
- O1: these are just existent causes mixed together (e.g., unicorn = horn + horse)
- R1: the concept may be caused by existent causes, but the content of the thought isn't of those existent causes
- O1: these are just existent causes mixed together (e.g., unicorn = horn + horse)
- R2: different causes, same content
- R3: same cause, different content
- R4: reducing intentionality to an object ipso facto loses the 'aboutness' necessary for intentionality
- R1: non-existent causes (e.g., unicorn)
- O2 (Dennett): intentionality has no explanatory power so we shouldn't posit it
- R1: it isn't something posited to explain, but something observed and in need of explaining