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ethics

Chester’s Divine Command Theory

September 2, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

In this video, I interview theologian Chester Delagneau about his version of the metaethical Divine Command Theory.

NOTES

Further Reading

Chester Delagneau, "Biblical Ethics"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: divine command theory, ethics, virtue ethics

Intuitionism: Is ‘good’ indefinable?

August 14, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Intuitionists think that you can't define 'good,' but that you can know basic moral truths through intuition.

NOTES

  • Good is indefinable
    • Some terms have to be this way
      • If every term were defined by other terms, then at least some would be defined in a circle
    • A1 (Moore)
      1. In a definition, the definiendum and definiens are interchangeable
      2. The definiendum 'good' is not interchangeable with any definiens
        • S1: it is always conceivable that the two are not the same
        • E.g., CR: "Good" = "socially acceptable"
          • Is it conceivable that a society accepts what's bad?
          • Yes, you could imagine them accepting anything, and something has to be bad
      3. So, 'good' is indefinable
  • Good is
    • objective
    • real
    • non-natural
  • Self-evident basic moral truths
    • Intuition
      • Not inference
        • A1: is-ought fallacy
          1. Moral reasoning must look like this:
            1. X is Y
            2. So, you ought to do X
            • E.g.,
              • Helping others is socially acceptable
              • So, you ought to help others
          2. This reasoning is invalid
            • It's always possible that (a) is true and (b) is false
          3. So, we can't know basic moral truths through inference
    • Doesn't mean you can't be wrong
      • Modus ponens is self-evident and obvious
      • Modus tollens isn't
        • If Pablo goes surfing, so will Queenie
        • Queenie doesn’t surf
        • Could Pablo go surfing?
        • If he did, then Queenie would go
        • But we just said she doesn't
      • Affirming the consequent seems self-evident, but is false
    • intuition
      • direct intellectual apprehension- we see it directly and can't be wrong
      • Alternatively, intellectual seeming- it seems to be a certain way to us, but that doesn't mean it is that way for sure
        • In the same way as perceptual seemings
  • O1: natures are discovered empirically
    • Water & H2O
    • R1: good is different
      • Concept of water is purely phenomenological, but concept of good isn't like that
  • O2: moral disagreement
    • Trolley problems
      • Switch
      • Fat man
      • Matters which order you hear them in
      • People disagree about answers
    • R1: agreement in the basics
      • Don't harm without cause
      • Just not sure in these cases what considerations outweigh which
      • O1: disagreement in basics
        • Maximize good consequences
        • Set of rules: don't kill fetuses, don't rape, etc.
  • O3: source of intuitions
    • Many moral intuitions come from society
      • See the burning widow video
    • R1: some are universal

Further Reading

G.E. Moore, "Principia Ethica"

W.D. Ross, "The Right and the Good"

H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics"

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, intuitionism

Prescriptivism: Is morality just a bunch of commands?

August 8, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Prescriptivism is the view that any moral claim is really just a command. There is no truth value to moral claims, but that doesn't mean we can't reason morally.

NOTES

Further Reading

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

R.M. Hare, "Freedom and Reason"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, prescriptivism

Emotivism: Are moral judgments just emotional ejaculations?

August 8, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Emotivism is the view that ethical judgments are really just interjections expressing one's feelings about the thing in question.

NOTES

Further Reading

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: emotivism, ethics

Ideal Observer View: Is what’s good what the most rational person wants?

August 6, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Ideal Observer View is a form of subjectivism where what is good is determined by whatever a fully informed, totally impartial, rational agent would want to do.

NOTES

Further Reading

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics

Subjectivism: Is right or wrong up to the individual?

August 4, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Does morality depend on the individual?

NOTES

Further Reading

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, subjective, subjectivism

Problem of Evil and the Moral Argument

December 24, 2020 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Problem of Evil is intended to show that God does not exist, but interestingly enough one of the premises it rests on--indeed, the most surprising one--can be used to prove the exact opposite: the premise that "Evil exists." How can the existence of evil show God exists? Is there a way to avoid this result?

NOTES

The Moral Argument for the Existence of God

  1. If evil exists, then an objective, obligatory standard of being exists
    • A1: analytic truth
  2. If it is obligatory, it was designed by an intelligent agent
    • A1: we are not obliged to standards from non-persons
    • A2: the concept of being wrong assumes the standard was an intentional creation
  3. If it is obligatory and designed by an intelligent agent, that intelligent agent was a creator that endued the obligation
    • A1: avoids the externalist-only regress (and the internalist-only lack of motivation)
  4. So, if evil exists, an intelligent creator exists
  5. Evil exists
    • A1: claimed in the Problem of Evil
      • O1: give up the claim from the Problem of Evil
        • R1: special pleading
      • O2: "If God existed, then this would have been evil."
        • R1: impossible counterfactual
  6. So, an intelligent creator (God) exists
  • O1: entails that atheists can't be moral or that atheists can't have an ethical system
    • R1: this is an argument about what makes the moral system true, not what needs to be believed to be moral or have an ethical system

Further Reading

My version of this argument is similar to that found in Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, though I think an amalgam of DCT and Aristotelian natures is the most convincing grounding of morality.

Filed Under: Existence of God, Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: apologetics, ethics, evil, existence of God, good, moral argument, morality, philosophy, problem of evil, theology

Should we kill off the weak?

July 25, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

This week we have been considering a view called ethical egoism and I gave you the example of the Plank of Carneades. When I give this dilemma in class, sometimes my students will argue for the egoistic choice by noting that in the moment of choice your survival instinct would kick in. You would naturally want to fight off the other person and giving up the plank would be unnatural. The implication is that things that are natural are good.

This style of argument is similar to what is given by a different but somewhat related system of morality. Evolutionary ethics is the view that we have a moral obligation to aid the evolution of our species. Natural selection hones the human race to be ever more adept at survival. To fight against this could only serve to weaken our race, and this is surely a bad thing. The human race naturally progresses towards a greater goal, so it would be wrong to interfere. However, living in a society instead of in nature creates an artificial environment in which evolution is stymied. Therefore, we should try to correct this as much as possible.

If this sounds at all familiar it should: this is the logic employed by the Nazis. Typically when someone compares something to Image result for nazi propagandathe Nazis, they do so fallaciously (a phenomenon documented here). In logic, a ‘false analogy’ is reasoning that just because two things are similar in one way, they must be similar in an unrelated way. This is exactly how much politicking goes on. I’ve heard people say (and I’m not endorsing anyone), “President Trump distrusts the press. You know who else had a problem with the press? Hitler.” A couple years back it was, “President Obama blames the rich for the problems in America. You know who else blamed a group of people? Hitler.”  The problem is that, just because someone is similar to Hitler in one way doesn’t mean they are similar to him in other, objectionable ways . Otherwise, we could say, “President Lincoln drank water. You know who else drank water?” However, in the case of evolutionary ethics, we are no longer appealing to irrelevant similarities. The Nazis reasoned that the weak would die off naturally but due to artificial circumstances (society) they survive. Worse, they are allowed to breed and thereby pollute the gene pool. The obvious conclusion is that they should not be allowed to survive. So, the Nazis euthanized them (for a gnarly example of what this would be like, watch season 2 of The Man in the High Castle, but not before reading the excellent book by my favorite author, Philip K. Dick.

Hopefully, you haven’t found the Nazi case too convincing because it is logically fallacious. Appeal to Nature is a fallacy on which we assume something is good just because it is natural (for our purposes, assume “natural” means “occurs without human engineering”). So, for example, in the movie “Friday,” Smokey says weed is from the Earth, implying it is good because it is natural. You know what else comes from the Earth? Lead. Does that mean you should shoot yourself (this isn’t a proof that marijuana is bad, but this argument certainly is)? When the evolutionary ethicist appeals to the “nature” part of natural Image result for drowningselection, she is making the same assumption. Even if evolution happens in nature, so does murder. That doesn’t make murder good.

The same should be said about the way my aforementioned students argued. They said that since we naturally have a survival instinct, we should employ that instinct. Again, just because something happens in nature, doesn’t mean it’s good. You may want to kill in order to survive, but that doesn’t mean you should. In fact, we have all kinds of natural desires we should avoid. We naturally desire to hit people, take things that aren’t ours, and eat the M&M’s out of the trail mix so dad is left with peanuts and salt-caked raisins. But we shouldn’t.

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: appeal to nature, egoism, ethical egoism, ethics, evolutionary ethics, hitler, informal fallacies, logic, natural, nature, nazis, philip k. dick, philosophy, survival

Beggars Can’t Be Choosers? Philosophy and Choice

December 15, 2017 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

One day when I lived in Philadelphia a homeless person asked me for money. Normally I would offer to buy him food rather than give him money because I knew there was a problem with drug Choiceand alcohol abuse amongst the homeless and I was afraid I might be enabling an epidemic. On this particular day, however, I was running late for something very important. I couldn’t stop to buy something—but I did have a $20 bill in my pocket. I thought quickly: this money could really help someone trying to get back on his feet, or it could really do a lot of damage to someone struggling with addiction. Should I give it to him and hope for the best? Should I withhold it and risk letting someone go hungry? What choice should I make? What would you choose?

One choice would be to give it no thought and just do whatever I felt like doing. However, imagine someone who lived in such an impulsive way:Liberty Bell acting purely on desire and without any thought. Such a person (a ‘wanton,’ to use Harry Frankfurt’s term) would be little better than a wild animal: giving or keeping, helping or harming, hugging or strangling with whatever whim happens upon her. Such a capricious life has never been attractive to me, so this wasn’t really a choice. I needed a thoughtful decision.

The problem is that there are so many considerations that choices like this can be confusing. Here are three examples:

  1. Is it best to give people the means to make their own choice or is it best to give them an environment that is most conducive to success?
  2. Is it better to have a society where people help each other or one where people are independent?
  3. Why should I help someone in the first place?

These questions are, respectively, questions of human nature, political philosophy, and ethics. In other words, these are philosophical questions, and they have a direct impact on our lives.

On that Philly sidewalk, I didn’t have the time to sift through all these criteria; I had only a few moments to act. Philosophy is something best done when we have time to sit and consider, not on the fly. So, one reason we have to do philosophy (and read philosophy blog posts) is that it will help us to make the difficult decisions that arise in life.

Filed Under: Ethical Dilemmas, Purpose of Philosophy Tagged With: choice, ethical dilemma, ethics, freeedom, introduction to philosophy, liberty, moral dilemma, morality, philosophy