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eliminativism

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

May 31, 2020 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: eliminativism, functionalism, identity theory, logical behaviorists, non-reductivism, philosophy of mind, physicalism, psychological, reductivism

Eliminativism: Is “mind” just a pre-neuroscience word?

January 9, 2020 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The mind-body problem asks whether or not we have a mind distinct from our brain. Eliminativists argue that the idea of a mind is a pre-scientific entity that has been superseded by neuroscience. In this video, I review the main eliminativist argument and it’s objections.

NOTES

  • Mind-body Problem
    • Brain is material; mind seems immaterial
    • What is really real?
      • The brain only?
      • The mind only?
      • The brain and the mind?
      • Neither?
  • The Eliminativist Argument
    • 1. When belief in an entity is solely the result of a folk theory that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory, you should stop believing in that entity
    • 2. Belief in the mind is the result of a folk theory (folk psychology) that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory (neuroscience)
    • 3. So, we should stop believing the mind exists
    • O1: I posit other minds b/c of direct observation of my own
    • O2: I have direct access to my experiences right now, regardless of whether I posited them as a theory or not
      • R1: you are not having an experience at all; this is just an illusion
        • O1: an illusion is an experience

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: eliminativism, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, physicalism