• Skip to content

dualism

Argument from Semantic Determinacy

August 1, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

James F. Ross gives an argument that thinking must be a non-physical process because concepts are semantically determinate, whereas no physical thing is determinate.

NOTES

Argument from Semantic Determinacy of Thought

  1. There is a fact of the matter about what concepts mean
  2. There is no fact of the matter about what anything physical means
  3. So, concepts are not physical
  • O1: our thoughts aren't determinate
    • R1: self-defeating
  • O2 (Peter Dillard): in computer science, there is a determinate difference between an and-gate, an or-gate
    • R1: physically determinate, not semantically determinate
  • O3: neuroscience shows connection between thought and brain
    • R1: the physical is necessary, but not sufficient, for thought

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Edward Feser, “Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought," https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf follow up blog post: https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, mind

What is Cartesian Dualism?

July 27, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Cartesian dualism is the idea that you are a soul using a body. In this video, I look at a few objections that are specific to this form of dualism.

NOTES

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, renee descartes

The Mind-Body Interaction Problem

July 26, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

If the mind isn't material, how could it cause the body to do anything?

NOTES

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, mind

The Plurality Thesis

July 25, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Plurality Thesis is a strange result of physicalism that claims every object is actually billions of overlapping objects. Dualists use this to reject physicalism in philosophy of mind.

NOTES

  • Plurality Thesis
    1. Any physical object, O, will have some particle, P, along its edge which has just as good of a claim to be part of O as to not be part of O
    2. So, O-with-P has just as much of a claim to be the object as O-without-P
    3. So, both are objects that overlap everywhere but at P
    4. There are billions of particles like P around O
    5. So, for every object O, there are billions of overlapping O’s
  • Argument from the Plurality Thesis
  1. PA: Physicalism is true
  2. So, Plurality Thesis
  3. I am in a certain psychological state, E
  4. By (1), my brain, B, is in E
  5. By (2) and (4), there are billions of brains in E
  6. ~(5)
    • S1: I clearly don’t share my psychological states with any other brains, much less billions
  7. So, ~(1)
  8. So, dualism is true
  • N1: this isn't quite true--disproving physicalism leaves it open that you could be an ontological idealist
  • N2: proves substance dualism

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, mind

The Difference Argument

July 24, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Difference Argument is used by dualists to show that the mind has properties the brain doesn't and is therefore a different kind of thing.

NOTES

  1. If the mind and some part of the brain, B, are identical, then the mind and B must have all properties in common
  2. The mind has a property, F, and B lacks F
    • S1: intentional aspect of thought
    • S2: sensations
    • S3: first-person experience
    • S4: unity of consciousness
      1. People have a united conscious experience
      2. Complex things cannot have a united consciousness
        • S1: consciousness is not additive
        • S2: a set is not a thing, so it doesn't have properties
      3. A simple physical thing does not have a united consciousness
        • O1: there could be a CPU in the brain that is the locus of all awareness
          • R1: there is no evidence that brains work this way and good evidence they don’t
          • R2: such a module would be complex, leading this argument to regress back to a simple physical particle with united consciousness, which would be strange
      4. So, mind has a property the body doesn’t
  3. So, the mind and B are not identical
  4. So, dualism is true

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, mind

What is dualism?

July 18, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

In this video, I explain what dualism is, the difference between property and substance dualism, the difference between different kinds of substance dualisms (including Cartesian dualism), and motivations for and against being a dualist.

NOTES

Motivations for and against

  • A1: the mind is the center of personhood, which is not material
    • S1: material body constantly changes, person remains the same
    • S2: personhood isn't quantifiable like matter
  • A2: thinking seems prima facie to be immaterial
    • R1: the brain has a causal effect on thinking
      • O1: damaged equipment
  • A3: sense of transcendence
  • A4: religious
  • O1: makes minds sound like ghosts in a shell
  • O2: doesn’t neuroscience explain everything going on in thinking?
  • O3: mind sounds like soul, and soul is religion
  • O4: scientism

Further Reading

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, philosophy of mind

The Intentionality Argument

June 15, 2021 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Our thoughts are about things, a property we call intentionality. Material objects do not exhibit intentionality. In this video, I consider the possibility that this shows our minds are immaterial.

NOTES

THE INTENTIONALITY ARGUMENT

  1. Thoughts have intentionality
  2. Material things don't have intentionality
  3. So, thoughts are not material things
  • O1: causal view of intentionality
    • R1: non-existent causes (e.g., unicorn)
      • O1: these are just existent causes mixed together (e.g., unicorn = horn + horse)
        • R1: the concept may be caused by existent causes, but the content of the thought isn't of those existent causes
    • R2: different causes, same content
    • R3: same cause, different content
    • R4: reducing intentionality to an object ipso facto loses the 'aboutness' necessary for intentionality
  • O2 (Dennett): intentionality has no explanatory power so we shouldn't posit it
    • R1: it isn't something posited to explain, but something observed and in need of explaining

 

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind, James D. Madden

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, intentionality, philosophy of mind

The Modal Argument

March 27, 2020 by The Philosurfer 3 Comments

The Modal Argument is an argument that the mind must be a distinct thing from the brain. The idea is that identity is a necessary property, but the mind and brain could possibly be distinct, so they must not be identical.

NOTES

  • physicalism- only physical things exist
    • physical- describable/explainable by physics
    • Types of physicalism
      • ontological physicalism- everything that exists is physical
      • psychological physicalism- the mind is physical
  • Modal Argument
    1. A thing is necessarily identical to itself
    2. So, if the mind and brain are the same thing, then they are necessarily the same
    3. It's possible that the mind and brain not be the same
    4. So, the mind and the brain are not the same
      • By (2), (3); (rule of modal logic)
  • Arguments for premise (3) of the Modal Argument
    • A1: Conceivability Argument
      1. What is conceivable is possible
      2. It's conceivable that we exist apart from our brains
        • S1: dreams
        • S2 (Descartes): brain in a vat/evil genius demon
        • S3: NDEs
      3. So it's possible that our minds are separate from our brains
    • A2 (Descartes): Essential Property Argument
      1. Everything has one essential property that makes it what it is
        • O1 (existentialists): there are no essential properties, only existence
          • R1: implausible
        • O2: there is no reason there couldn't be more than one essential property
      2. For us, it is our thinking alone
        • S1: methodological doubt
          1. In all those other examples, we can doubt whether our bodies exist or not
          2. We can't doubt whether the doubter exists
          3. So, this must be our essential property
        • O3: we don't always think
          • R1: our essential property is our capacity to think
            • O1: psychological physicalists believe the mind's capacity to think is the brain
      3. So, we can exist even if our bodies don't

Further Reading

Most of this can be found in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, modal argument, philosophy of mind

Mind-Body Problem

July 20, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Philosophy of mind is one of the most interesting and most debated areas of philosophy today. It all centers around the mind-body problem—but what exactly is this problem? And, why are so many philosophers so passionate about it? 

Filed Under: Philosophy of Mind Tagged With: dualism, materialism, mind-body problem, philosophy of mind, physicalism