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Philosophy of Religion

Euthyphro Dilemma 2: Does God pick what’s right or wrong arbitrarily?

October 6, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Euthyphro Dilemma was posed in Plato’s “Euthyphro.” Adapted for our purposes, it asks what God’s role is in determining what is good and what is evil. Is it that God has no say in the matter but only reinforces what is already so, or is it that God determines what is good or evil? Either choice seems to bring undesirable consequences.

In this second video, I explore the option that God determines what is good or evil: that there is no moral law until God chooses what will go into the moral law. This option seems open to the objections that (1) the moral law is arbitrarily chosen, (2) God has made a non-rational choice, and (3) it’s difficult to see how obligation attaches to these commands if there is no prior set of rules about what is right and wrong.

NOTES

  • Horn 2
    • God decides:
      • Saving an innocent person’s life is good
      • Torturing babies for fun is evil
    • And that’s what makes those things good/evil respectively
  • O1: Arbitrary
  • O2: Non-rational
  • O3: No obligation

Filed Under: Euthyphro Dilemma, Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: euthyphro dilemma

Euthyphro Dilemma 1: Are moral truths independent of God?

October 6, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Euthyphro Dilemma was posed in Plato’s “Euthyphro.” Adapted for our purposes, it asks what God’s role is in determining what is good and what is evil. Is it that God has no say in the matter but only reinforces what is already so, or is it that God determines what is good or evil? Either choice seems to bring undesirable consequences.

In this first video, I explore the possibility that what is good or evil is determined before God gets to choose. This option lends itself to four objections we will consider. It seems inconsistent with God’s (1) sovereignty, (2) omnipotence, and (3) free will, and (4) it posits a mysterious list of rules uncreated by God.

NOTES

  • Horn 1
    • Saving an innocent person’s life is good
    • Torturing babies for fun is evil
    • God knows these things
    • So, God tells us not to do those things
  • O1: Sovereignty
  • O2: Omnipotence
  • O3: Freedom of the will
  • O4: moral truths are mysterious

Filed Under: Euthyphro Dilemma, Philosophy of Evil

The Hindu ‘Maya’ Response to the Problem of Evil

August 31, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The problem of evil is this: How could God allow evil? Hinduism is a very diverse religion and this problem doesn't apply to many forms of it: only henotheistic versions where Brahman is infinite. Interestingly, in that case Hinduism has a unique tool for dealing with the problem of evil: the doctrine of maya. Everything, including evil, is an illusion, so there is no problem of evil! Is such a doctrine possible? Can all evil be an illusion?

NOTES

Logical Problem of Evil

1. If God exists, God could prevent evil

   S1: omniscient & omnipotent

2. If God exists, God would prevent evil

   S1: omnibenevolent

3. So, if God exists, evil doesn’t exist

4. Evil exists

5. So, God doesn’t exist

The Main Ideas

i. Assume Brahman is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent

ii. The world is an illusion

ii. So, evil is an illusion

Objections

O3: suffering is real even if the physical isn't

O4: evil isn't an illusion; separateness from Brahman is an illusion, and this is evil

Filed Under: Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: hinduism, problem of evil

The Mormon Response to The Problem of Evil

August 10, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The problem of evil is this: How could God allow evil? Mormonism has a unique answer in that it rejects the idea that God has unlimited power, so that God couldn’t prevent evil—it wasn’t God’s fault! But, how can we say God has limited power? Are there some evils God could have prevented even with the limited power available? Check out the video to find out more!

Why I'm Still Using 'LDS' and 'Mormonism'

Sometime last year (2018), I read that the leader of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, president Russell Nelson, claimed to receive a revelation from God (this is not an unusual claim for the leader of this religion, as he is always considered to be a ‘prophet, seer, revelator’). He said that God had impressed on his mind that people should use the full name ‘The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints’ to reference his religion, though it could be shortened to ‘The Church,’ ‘The Church of Jesus Christ,’ or ‘The Restored Church of Jesus Christ.’ Further, it is no longer acceptable for anyone to use the traditional abbreviated terms ‘LDS’ or ‘Mormonism.’ He then asked everyone—not just members of his religion—to do the same. After thinking about it for a good amount of time, I decided I am going to continue to use the traditional shortened terms, and I would like to respectfully explain why.

There are two reasons I can see that I should stop using ‘Mormon’ and ‘LDS.’ First, President Nelson, and the adherents of his faith along with him, believe that God told him I should. I am not a Mormon, I don’t believe President Nelson is a prophet, and I don’t believe God wants me to stop using these terms—but they believe it. Obviously I am not under any religious obligation when I’m not part of the religion—in fact it’s odd for a religion to have rules for unbelievers to follow insofar as they are unbelievers—but does respect for the LDS faith compel me to acquiesce? I don’t think that it does. You can’t respect a faith if you don’t take it seriously enough to disagree openly with it. Pretending to go along with it is just pandering, and I don’t think anyone wants that. I don’t believe God said this, so respect for the LDS faith compels me to say so.

The second reason is a little more difficult: LDS members themselves, including President Nelson, wish to be called by these names. Generally, I want to make people happy. It usually costs very little effort for me to use a different name, so why not do so? I think the answer to that differs for the four names.

First, let’s consider “The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.” This is a perfectly acceptable name for the faith and I have no problem with it in principle, but it’s clearly a practical problem. That name is absurdly long for use in conversation. It’s a name for a letterhead, not for everyday speech. It’s just too impractical to use this name when speaking of the LDS church. Mercifully, President Nelson says that God allows us to shorten the name after the first use, but even the first use is a little ridiculous.

The name ‘The Church’ is obviously a huge improvement in brevity, but what it lacks in length it makes up for in confusion. ‘The Church,’ when used as a proper noun, has historically referred to all Christians. It is true that the founders of Mormonism claimed to be the only true Christians and that all existing Christian denominations were an abomination, but the current stance of the LDS is that they are just another denomination of Christianity. For that reason, I don’t think President Nelson means to claim that the LDS has the only true Christians when he says we should use this name, but then the name’s use is confusing.

The name ‘The Church of Jesus Christ’ is much worse in that sense. This sounds like a furtive claim to be the true church of Jesus. Again, that’s not the official stance of the LDS anymore, but this moniker makes it sound like we’re turning back the clock. It may not have been the intention of President Nelson to do so, but words are powerful and asking to be called by a name like this has psychological ramifications that are impossible to ignore. Imagine, for example, if Baptists asked everyone to call them ‘The Church of Jesus Christ.’ How bombastic does that sound? For that reason, I think this name is wholly unacceptable.

The last name is ‘The Restored Church of Jesus Christ.’ The term ‘restored’ is meant to indicate that the Christian church almost immediately apostatized after the apostles died. We have no evidence that such a thing happened and very good evidence that the Christianity practiced for 2,000 years is relevantly the same as that practiced in the first few centuries. However, LDS theology holds that it isn’t. The official teaching is that we’ve spent the last 1,900 years practicing an abomination, and it was only with Joseph Smith that the church was “restored.” I am a Christian, so I obviously disagree, and calling the LDS ‘The Restored Church of Jesus Christ’ is just a smack in the face for me. So, I can’t use this name.

I can definitely see why the name ‘Mormon’ is odd, but not why it’s bad. The cornerstone of Mormonism is the Book of Mormon. It would sound weird for someone to call me a “Bible-ite,” but I can’t see why that would be bad. The name ‘LDS’ is just short for ‘Latter-Day Saints’ which is short for ‘The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.’ That seems to me rather useful.

I’ll be honest—this post is not very well-written. These kinds of things are not really what I’m passionate about, so I really don’t want to spend too much time on them. However, it is important to me that any Mormons that have seen my videos or read anything I have written about their faith understand that I don’t use these terms flippantly. It’s just that the options President Nelson has provided are either impractical or theologically unacceptable and there was nothing wrong with the traditional terms. For that reason, I am going to keep using them.

NOTES

Logical Problem of Evil

1. If God exists, God could prevent evil

   S1: omniscient & omnipotent

2. If God exists, God would prevent evil

   S1: omnibenevolent

3. So, if God exists, evil doesn’t exist

4. Evil exists

5. So, God doesn’t exist

Supporting Argument for (1)

assume: 6. God exists

7. God is all-knowing

8. Evil is something to know how to prevent

∴9. God knows how to prevent evil

10. God is all-powerful

11. Evil is something to have the power to prevent

∴12. God has the power to prevent evil

13. An agent can prevent something if she knows how to do so and has the power to do so

∴14. If God exists, God could prevent evil

The Main Ideas

i. God is an exalted man who is not omnipotent

ii. So, (10) is false

iii. But God is still powerful enough to prevent some evils that he doesn't

iv. So, this response isn't enough

Filed Under: Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: lds, mormonism, omnioptence, problem of evil

The Open Theist Response to The Problem of Evil

August 7, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Problem of Evil is this: How could God exist if evil exists? This objection assumes God would know how to stop evil since God is all-knowing—but what if God were all-knowing and still couldn’t know how to stop evil? Does such a possibility even make sense? Open Theism proposes just such a solution.

NOTES

Logical Problem of Evil

1. If God exists, God could prevent evil

   S1: omniscient & omnipotent

2. If God exists, God would prevent evil

   S1: omnibenevolent

3. So, if God exists, evil doesn’t exist

4. Evil exists

5. So, God doesn’t exist

Supporting Argument for (1)

assume: 6. God exists

7. God is all-knowing

8. Evil is something to know how to prevent

∴9. God knows how to prevent evil

10. God is all-powerful

11. Evil is something to have the power to prevent

∴12. God has the power to prevent evil

13. An agent can prevent something if she knows how to do so and has the power to do so

∴14. If God exists, God could prevent evil

The Main Ideas

i. Future free will decisions do not currently exist and are not determined right now

ii. So, God does not know what will happen in those cases

ii. This doesn’t count against omniscience because these are not things that exist, so they are not things to know

iv. Since God doesn’t know what we are going to do, He can’t know the evils we will bring about

v. So, even though God is omniscient, He doesn’t know how to stop evil

So, (8) is false

Major Assumptions of Open Theism

(OT1) God’s knowledge works like ours, only on a much bigger scale

(OT2) The future does not exist

(OT3) Libertarian free will is possible

(OT4) Libertarian free will is necessary for culpability

(OT5) Divine foreknowledge prevents libertarian free will

Filed Under: Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: open theism, problem of evil

Burden of Proof and the Problem of Evil

August 5, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

In a recent video, I examined the Problem of Evil: How could a good God allow evil to exist? The argument is as follows:

  1. If God existed, He could prevent evil because He is all-powerful and all-knowing
  2. If God existed, He would prevent evil because He is all-good
  3. So, if God existed, evil would not exist
  4. But, evil exists
  5. So, God doesn’t exist

Theists typically object to premise (2) and in the video, I enumerated four reasons an all-good God could possibly allow evil. An interesting thing to note, however, is that I need not have done so in order to show the Problem of Evil fails because I didn’t have the ‘burden of proof.’

What is the ‘burden of proof’?

The ‘burden of proof’ is the obligation for proving why things are the way they are. In general, the burden of proof rests on whoever is making the claim. For example, let’s say Allen believes in aliens and Denise denies aliens exist (personally, I have no opinion on this matter). Denise says, “Aliens can’t exist: no one has ever seen one!” Allen points out, “That doesn’t prove anything. We’ve never seen dark matter, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.” Notice that Allen hasn’t proved that aliens exist, but he doesn’t need to. He only needs to show Denise hasn’t proven her claim.

Say Denise then gives Allen a reason. “Well, we should expect they would have made contact.” Notice, however, that this is yet another claim, so once again Denise shoulders the burden of proof, this time for the new claim (this will continue until Denise finds an acceptable claim to support the reasons she has given). So, Allen could ask, “Why believe aliens should have contacted us?” Again, Allen hasn’t proved we should not expect that aliens would have contacted us already. If he wants to make his point even stronger he can provide a reason why we shouldn’t. Maybe he could say, “An alien species might see that we don’t like outsiders.” This might be a good reason, in which case Allen’s point is all the more reinforced. However, if it isn’t, this doesn’t mean anything for Denise’s argument. She still has failed to make her case.

Who has the burden of proof in the Problem of Evil?

In the case of the Problem of Evil, the claim is being made: “God cannot exist because an all-good God wouldn’t allow evil.” For that reason, the burden of proof is on the atheist to show God could have no reason for allowing evil. After all, a being that is all-good would certainly not commit evil himself, but it is not obvious that he wouldn’t allow evil at all.

Let’s say the atheist gives us a reason: “When a person could prevent an evil but doesn’t we think that person is not good, so God would not be good if He were to allow evil.” Now we have a reason, but notice this reason is also subject to criticism. So, for example, we could point out that this isn’t always true. I might allow my son to procrastinate studying and fail a test in order for him to learn that there are consequences for irresponsibility. Or, more to the point, we might point out that God is an infinite intelligence, so He might have reasons for allowing evil that we don’t know.

Why give reasons?

Notice, however, that we still don’t need to give any reasons. It is sufficient to point out that the atheist’s argument doesn’t show God couldn’t allow evil. In fact, in this case it might be that it’s impossible to give the reasons God allows evil. First of all, it might be beyond our ken to understand. Human psychology hasn’t come far enough along to show us why we do everything we do, certainly we shouldn’t expect to understand why God does everything He does. If God were easy to understand, He wouldn’t be God. Second, God may have many reasons for allowing evil, and it may be that not every reason applies to every evil. So, for example, I might allow my son to surf a wave that scares him a little bit because it will develop courage in him. This is a different reason than why I let him fail the test. God might have an infinite number of reasons and expecting a silver bullet-type response is unrealistic. Finally, God might have some good purpose for hiding His reasons.

However, we might still give some possible reasons, as I do in the video, to make the case even more convincing. If these reasons fail, then nothing is lost. It has still been shown that the atheist has not provided sufficient justification for the claim that God couldn’t have any reasons for allowing evil.

Of course, ultimately the theist will not be satisfied with defending God against accusations of being an impossible being. She will want to go further and say God exists, and this is a claim that gives the theist the burden of proof for showing why we should believe this. The point here is that she need not prove this in the discussion of the Problem of Evil because here she doesn’t shoulder the burden of proof.

Filed Under: Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: burden of proof, God, logic, philosophy of religion, problem of evil

The Logical Problem of Evil

August 4, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

 It’s the most difficult question for any believer of God: How could a good God allow evil? In this video, I lay out the logical problem of evil (as distinct from the evidential and existential problems).

NOTES

Types of Problems of Evil

-Logical

-Evidential

-Existential

The Logical Problem of Evil

1. If God exists, God could prevent evil

S1: omniscient and omnipotent

2. If God exists, God would prevent evil

S1: omnibenevolent

3. So, if God exists, evil doesn’t exist

4. Evil exists

5. So, God doesn’t exist

Filed Under: Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: problem of evil

Why is there evil?

August 2, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Of all the mysteries of reality—and there are many—it is the starkest: Why does evil exist? This video is the beginning of a series exploring the different answers philosophers have given to this most existentially forceful of all questions. I enumerate the different kinds of answers and briefly gesture to their assumptions, but I save an in-depth consideration for videos of the near future.

NOTES

  • Four kinds of answers:
    • Possibility 1: there is some purpose for evil
      • Big assumption: intelligent agent with control over everything (i.e., God)
      • Big question: Is such a purpose even possible?
    • Possibility 2: the existence of evil is always an effect of prior, often seemingly unrelated evil actions
      • Big assumption: law-like connection between a person’s actions and what they suffer
      • Big question: How do we explain seemingly undeserved suffering?
    • Possibility 3: the existence of evil is absurd
      • Big assumption: absurd things are possible
      • Big question: How can we accept that evil is absurd if we don’t accept that answer for anything else in the universe?
    • Possibility 4: evil doesn’t exist
      • Big assumption: absence of explanation proves nonexistence
      • Big question: How do we explain the phenomenology of evil (i.e., the way evil appears real to us)?
  • It seems like there should be a corresponding question of why good things happen, though we don’t usually ask it
  • Evil is a one kind of existential shock that begins us philosophizing

Filed Under: Philosophy of Evil Tagged With: problem of evil

Does faith get in the way of philosophy?

September 20, 2018 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

At times, philosophy overlaps with other disciplines. On some accounts of what philosophy is, philosophers should be totally open-minded about all possibilities and only settle on a belief once ample reasons have been given for believing it. Religion, however, demands faith about these beliefs. Regardless of reasons, a religion wants you to believe what it has to say. Does this mean religious people are at a disadvantage in philosophy? You could argue the following:
1. Philosophers should be open to consider anything
2. Religious people can’t consider certain things
3. So, religious people are at a disadvantage as philosophers

In response to this argument, let us consider a case elucidating the relation between philosophy and science. The ancient philosopher Aristotle hypothesized that what makes statements like Dogs are animals true is the existence of dogs and that animal is part of their constitution. However, what about before dogs existed? What would make Dogs are animals true then? Aristotle believed the universe has existed eternally as it is now, so there have always been dogs to make Dogs are animals true. At the time, there was no reason to reject this cosmology, so the open-minded philosopher would have to seriously consider Aristotle’s explanation.

Since then, however, our best science has shown us not only that the universe has not always been the same, but it hasn’t always existed (much less dogs). Is it incumbent on modern philosophers to take Aristotle’s explanation of what makes Dogs are animals true seriously in the name of open-mindedness? The idea seems absurd. The whole theory rests on a cosmology that has been shown to be scientifically false. Not only would open-mindedness not be a virtue here, it would be a vice. Science has done philosophers a service by cutting out philosophical theories that can’t be true. A philosopher would be wrong to reject this just because it came from outside of philosophy. Not only is it okay for philosophers not to be open-minded here, they should be closed-minded. In other words, (1) is false so long as there are good reasons against a possibility, whether philosophical or not.

Now consider the case of religion. Is it true that a religion wants you to believe something for no reason at all? Most religions wouldn’t say that. Most religions want you to believe something because theybelieve (i) they have special access to esoteric knowledge and (ii) there are good reasons for you to believe they have this special access. Of course, they could be wrong about this, but the time to be an open-minded philosopher is when considering these reasons. If the religion is right, then just as in the scientific case against Aristotle’s cosmology, philosophers should be closed-minded about contradictory possibilities. So, it’s only the case that a religion could interfere with philosophy if there aren’t good reasons to believe the religion, and whether or not there are good reasons will depend on each religion individually.

What about if the religion is wrong about (i) and (ii)? At this point, the ideas the religion espouses are still a possibility, but we no longer have any reason to reject other possibilities, so open-mindedness would be a virtue here. However, this still doesn’t mean faith is necessarily opposed to philosophy. The believer may to continue to believe, but remain open to other possibilities. In fact, this is analogous to what we do in much science. I might believe in Big Bang Theory over String Theory, but remain more or less open to the possibility that I’m wrong. I might continue to pursue evidence either way, ready to change my beliefs accordingly. In the same way, a religion might provide some reasons to trust it and we may believe it to that extent, while continuing to pursue the truth open-mindedly.
For more, please see my YouTube video “Is faith bad for philosophy?”

Filed Under: Philosophy of Religion Tagged With: Aristotle, belief, cosmology, evidence, faith, knowledge, reason, religion, science

Is Philosophy against My Faith?

January 11, 2018 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

I’m not Episcopalian, but I used to teach Introduction to Philosophy at an Episcopal school. One year, a student told me she was surprised the school offered my class because she thought it was antithetical to the faith. I reassured her that although there were a good deal of non-Christian philosophers that rejected Christianity on philosophical grounds, there were also a good deal of Christian philosophers who thought philosophy supported their beliefs. She surprised me, however, by saying that this was just the problem.Thomas Aquinas

(Warning: this is a philosophy blog, not a Bible study! What follows is definitely of interest as an exercise in reasoning, but my main goal is to assuage people who are afraid the Bible disallows them to do philosophy.)

Hebrews 11:6 says, “And without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.” Philosophy, however, seeks knowledge about just such things as God’s existence. Some would argue that you can’t believe in something if you know it. If this is so, then if philosophy is successful in showing God exists, then it would make it impossible to please God.

I don’t think this is the right interpretation, however, as there are other passages in the Bible that seem to teach Christians should engage in just such endeavors. In 1 Peter 3:15, Christians are admonished to “Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect….” Giving a reason for belief in God sounds a lot like what we were worried about before. Further, in the Book of Acts, the apostle Paul (the author of a great deal of the New Testament of the Bible) engages with philosophers (Stoics and Epicureans) on Mars Hill. He doesn’t tell them to quit their jobs, but rather reasons (or philosophizes?) with them. In this context, Paul is set out as a person to emulate. So, it seems like far from being something to avoid, Christians should engage their faith through philosophy.

Raphael, St Paul Preaching in Athens

How are we to resolve the tension between the different passages? I think there are several possibilities. First, it could be (and likely is) the case that we can never get total, indubitable knowledge of God’s existence through philosophy and must content ourselves with good reasons for believing in God (if they are available). If this is so, the problem is mitigated. It would still be the case that philosophy reduces the need for faith, but it would never obviate this need. If it’s also the case that pleasing God is proportional to the amount of faith we must rely on–i.e. more faith = more pleasing–then philosophy would lessen the amount God would be pleased, but it would also be commanded of us so that it is a necessary evil.

A more likely possibility, however, is that the two kinds of faith are different. In the latter case, the concern is for convincing others of God’s existence and the Christian soteriological plan (plan of salvation). However, Hebrews 11 is talking about living a life of trust in God. I’ll explain the difference through an analogy.

stove fire

When my oldest son was very young, he was fascinated by fire. He kept trying to touch the flame on the stove top and I had to keep telling him not to. Eventually, I gave him a little smack on the hand. I know, corporal punishment, right? But, it was all I could do to save his poor little hand from being burned. Of course, the little man couldn’t understand why I would do this. “Why would dad keep me from what I want?” I mean, think about it: fire is bright, it moves in really cool ways, and it feels nicer the closer you get to it (up to a point). Why would dad not only keep it from me, but even inflict pain on me! He didn’t understand why, but he did know that I loved him and that I knew better than him, and for that reason he chose to trust me. I think this is the kind of faith the writer of Hebrews is interested in. In order to please God, you have to trust him even when you don’t understand why something happens to you because you know He is wiser than you and He loves you. If that’s what the author means, then there is no conflict between this kind of faith and philosophical investigation.

Filed Under: Faith and Reason, Purpose of Philosophy Tagged With: belief, faith, introduction to philosophy, knowledge, objections to philosophy, philosurfer, why philosophy

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