Philosophy of Religion

Probabilistic Problem of Evil

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The classical Problem of Evil attempts to show God's existence is impossible, but things might be easier if we set our sights a little lower. The Probabilistic Problem of Evil attempts to show that the existence of God is improbable. In this video, I will look at a particular strategy for establishing this, which borrows the predictive methodology used in natural science.

NOTES

  • Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Pre-Skeptical Theism)
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs E
      • Hypothesis I (Hypothesis of Indifference): the universe is the result of indifferent forces
      • State of Affairs E: evil exists
    2. Hypothesis T predicts state of affairs ~E
      • Hypothesis T (Hypothesis of Theism): God created the universe
    3. I and T have equal prior probability
    4. If E obtains, then I is more probable than T
    5. If ~E obtains, then T is more probably than I
    6. E obtains
    7. So, I is more probable than T
    • O1: Skeptical Theism wouldn't predict ~E
  • Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Post-Skeptical Theism)
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs E
    2. Hypothesis S abstains from predicting E or ~E
      • Hypothesis S: Skeptical Theism
    3. I and S have equal prior probability
    4. If E obtains, then I is more probable than it was before
    5. If ~E obtains, then I is less probable than it was before
    6. If either E or ~E obtains, then the probability of S remains unaffected
    7. E obtains
    8. So, I is more probable than S
  •  Probabilistic Problem of Order
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs ~O
      • State of Affairs O: the universe displays an intelligible order
    2. Hypothesis S predicts state of affairs O
    3. I and S have equal prior probability
    4. If  ~O obtains, then I is more probable than S
    5. If O obtains, then S is more probable than I
    6. O obtains
    7. So, S is more probable than I

Further Reading

C. S. Lewis "The Problem of Pain"

The Megaphone Response to the Logical Problem of Evil

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Assume for the sake of argument that God allows evil for our own good: what if we don't want that? The Megaphone Response holds that the only thing that is truly desirable for us requires us to experience evil, so it's not the case that we don't want God to allow it.

NOTES

Megaphone Response

  1. The things of this world can at best provide temporary, limited happiness
  2. We most deeply desire inexhaustible happiness
  3. So, the things of this world cannot provide what we most deeply desire
  4. Only an eternal, infinitely good, immortal-making being could provide inexhaustible happiness
  5. Only God is an eternal, infinitely good, immortal-making being
  6. So, only God can provide what we most deeply desire
  7. We are easily deceived into futilely pursuing happiness through the things of this world
  8. Evil shocks into disillusionment with the good things in this world and forces us to pursue something different
  9. So, possibly one reason God allows evil is that we need it to refocus on what will truly satisfy our desire for happiness
  • O1: I don't want this disillusionment
    • R1: it's important enough to give anyway

Further Reading

C. S. Lewis "The Problem of Pain"

Does God allow suffering for the sake of love?

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Love is probably the most important things to humans apart from what we need to survive and for safety. In this video, I explore the possibility that love requires suffering, and then I relate this idea to the Problem of Evil.

NOTES

  • Types of love
    • Self-interested loves (Aristotle)
      • 1. Friendship of Utility
      • 2. Friendship of Pleasure
      • 3. Friendship of Virtue
    • True love (Aquinas)
      • Desire for the good of the beloved
  • Love defense
    • 1. True love requires serving the beloved
    • 2. Serving presupposes a lack of some good needed
    • 3. The lack of a needed good is an evil
    • 4. So, true love requires evil exist
    • 5. True love is a great good
    • 6. So, possibly God allows evil for the sake of true love
    • I think this argument could be improved by changing (1) to say that true love is greatly benefited by serving the beloved. This would change (4) to say that true love is greatly benefited by the existence of evil. The overall point wouldn’t change because God would still be allowing evil for the sake of true love.

The Manichaean Defense

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Why does God allow evil to exist? Possibly evil is necessarily connected to goodness. Maybe in order for us to have goodness, we must have evil as well. Or, maybe we need to have evil in order to understand what good is and to appreciate it.

NOTES

The Problem of Evil

  • 1. If God exists, He could prevent evil
    • S1: all-powerful & all-knowing
  • 2. If God exists, He would prevent evil
    • S1: all-good
  • So, 3. If God exists, evil doesn’t exist
  • 4. Evil exists
  • So, 5. God doesn’t exist

The Manichaean Defense

  • 1. Evil is necessarily tied to goodness such that, in order for good to exist, evil must exist
  • 2. It is good for there to be goodness
  • So, 3. Possibly, God allows evil for there to be goodness
  • O1: false ex hypothesi
    • God is all good and exists before anything else, so good is possible without evil
  • O2: counterexample
    • A world with one good thing and nothing else
  • O3: ontological link is questionable
    • 1. Manichaean View posits a necessary connection between the existence of good and the existence of evil
    • 2. There is no good reason to think such a link exists

The Epistemological Manichaean Defense

  • 1. Propositional knowledge can at best yield theoretic understanding of the good
  • 2. Experiential knowledge yields appreciation and enjoyment of the good
  • So, 3. Experiential knowledge is ceteris paribus better than propositional knowledge
  • So, 4. Possibly, God allows evil so we can appreciate and truly enjoy the good, whereas without it we wouldn’t be able to
  • O1: entails that sin is good
    • R1: we can experience evil w/o committing evil
      • Though it would still be the case that your experiential knowledge is good, the deed would still be bad overall
  • O2: I would rather just trust God about goodness rather than get experiential knowledge of evil
    • R1: even if it’s not what you prefer, it could still be good and therefore something God would allow

The Character Building Response

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Why does God allow evil? The Character Building Defense argues that it is because we become better people for it. Is it worth the suffering to build character?

NOTES

The Problem of Evil

  • 1. If God exists, He could prevent evil
    • S1: all-powerful & all-knowing
  • 2. If God exists, He would prevent evil
    • S1: all-good
  • So, 3. If God exists, evil doesn’t exist
  • 4. Evil exists
  • So, 5. God doesn’t exist

The Character Building Defense

  • God allows suffering because it makes us better people
  • O1: the character isn’t worth the suffering
    • R1: God allows little evils b/c it preps us for big evils
      • O1: why allow any evil?
    • R2: Possibly we can’t be happy w/o high character
      • P1: there is a necessary connection between character and happiness
        • E.g., cowardice lends itself to the suffering of fear
      • P2: it’s just the way we should be
    • R3: possibly it’s just a good thing to have strong character
      • S1: stories we read don’t feature someone who’s never had any evil happen and are cowards
        • O1: this is just comfort to get us through our current suffering
          • R1: we’re still looking forward to that thing we think will be worth it
      • S2: people who have the character built up wouldn’t give it up to avoid the evil
  • O2: God could have made us with high character already built in
    • R1: it’s good that we have something to do with our own character building
  • O3: not all evil is character building
    • S1: when someone dies
    • S2: when someone doesn’t react in a way that builds character
    • S3: animal suffering?
    • R1: partial response succeeds

The Free Will Defense

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Why does God allow evil? The Free Will Defense argues that it is a necessary consequence of free will, and that free will is worth the evil we suffer. Is this a sufficient reason? And is it possible to have free will without evil? 

NOTES

The Problem of Evil

  • 1. If God exists, He could prevent evil
    • S1: all-powerful & all-knowing
  • 2. If God exists, He would prevent evil
    • S1: all-good
  • So, 3. If God exists, evil doesn’t exist
  • 4. Evil exists
  • So, 5. God doesn’t exist

The Free Will Defense

  • 1. We have free will
  • 2. Evil is a necessary consequence of free will
    • O1: free will without consequences
      • S1: God could have made our brains such that we can make free will decisions to do the right thing, but every time we choose to do the wrong thing our brains stop us
      • R1: no consequences = no personal growth
      • R2: free will violation
    • O2: free will agents who don’t sin
      • 1. It is possible that no free will agent does evil
        • S1: we are only morally responsible for things that are possible for us, so anytime it is impossible for us not to make a choice, it can’t be a moral choice, and therefore it can’t be an evil choice
      • 2. God can create anything that is possible
        • S1: all-knowing and all-powerful
      • 3. Therefore, God could have made a world in which no free will agent does evil
      • R1 (Open Theism): free will decisions known ahead of time are determined, and therefore not free will
        • O1: they are determined by the agent, which is exactly free will
      • R2 (Molinism): there isn’t a possible world where no agents sin
        • O1: special pleading
      • N1: the limits of this objection
        • This doesn’t show God doesn’t allow some evil for the sake of our free will
        • It only shows God didn’t need to use evil as a means to an end: the good end of free will
        • Imagine I make the evil choice to steal a cupcake
        • God might have allowed the evil because it is good that I have free will even if it is bad that I steal
        • But, God also could have actualized the possible world in which I don’t steal the cupcake
        • So, there is a further question as to why God would actualize the cupcake-stealing world vs. the non-cupcake-stealing world
        • But, in the cupcake-stealing world, it’s still true that it was good for me to have free will even though I used it for villainy
    • O3: evils that can’t be explained by free will
      • S1: natural evils involve no free will choices (e.g., earthquakes, cancer)
        • Sometimes natural evils and free will evils are intertwined, like when companies push smoking on kids (free will evil) knowing that it causes cancer (natural evil)
        • But, there are also natural evils that have nothing to do with free will evils, like natural disasters that aren’t the result of climate change or anything like that
      • S2: evils suffered by people other than the free will agent
        • 1. The good of having free will is enjoyed by the free will agent
        • 2. But, the evil suffered is often suffered by someone other than the free will agent
        • 3. So, the good of one person is at the expense of another, which seems unfair
      • R1: Fallen World Theory
        • 1. The world began without any natural evils or evils suffered by people other than the free will agent
        • 2. Someone used their free will choice to do something evil: the Original Sin
        • 3. This Original Sin corrupted the world so that natural evils and evils suffered by people other than the free will agent would occur
        • 4. So, all of these evils are consequences of an original free will evil, the Original Sin
        • 5. The potential for the evil of the Original Sin was a necessary consequence of free will
        • 6. So, all evil, including natural evils and those suffered by people other than the free will agent, are the necessary consequence of free will
        • O1: the corruptibility of the world may have been a consequence of the Original Sin, but it wasn’t a necessary consequence, so these aren’t necessary consequences of Original Sin
          • S1: God could have made a world that doesn’t get corrupted into having natural evils when an original sin happens
          • S2: God could have put us in an isolated world with things that perfectly resemble people (e.g., a computer simulation or robots that are indistinguishable from humans) so that our free will choices don’t affect anyone else
    • 3. Free will is worth the evil
    • A1: most people wouldn’t give up their free will to avoid evil
    • A2: many things we value that require free will seem worth the evil
      • S1: heroism

Important notes

  • If the Free Will Defense fails, that doesn’t mean the Problem of Evil succeeds
    • S1: premise (2) remains unmotivated because God isn’t a moral agent like ourselves so that we can predict everything He would do
    • S2: there are possible other reasons for God to allow evil
  • If the Free Will Defense fails, free will might still explain why God allows some evils, just not all evils

Molinism and the Problem of Evil

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Molinism is a view that attempts to resolve two doctrines that seem at odds with each other. First, that God predestines an elect people for salvation. Second, that we freely choose salvation. Both doctrines and the problem itself come from Christianity, though the tenets can be shared in other monotheistic religions. The Molinist solution is that God predestines us by creating the right circumstances that would lead to us freely choosing salvation. 

The Problem of Evil is the question of why God would allow evil. If we accept the Molinist solution to the first problem, we could possibly use it to answer the second: God allows evil because it is part of the circumstances that would lead a person to choose salvation.

Is Molinism tenable? Can it be combined in this way to solve the Problem of Evil?

NOTES

  • Problem of Evil
    • 1. If God exists, then He could prevent evil
      • S1: He is all-powerful and all-knowing
    • 2. If God exists, then He would prevent evil
      • S1: He is all-good
    • So, 3. If God exists, then evil doesn’t exist
    • 4. Evil exists
    • So, 5. God doesn’t exist
  • Molinism
    • The following are three kinds of knowledge God has in the logical order He has them:
      • Natural knowledge = God's knowledge of all necessary truths (e.g., "2+2=4", "A squared circle is impossible")
      • Middle knowledge = knowledge of all CCFs
        • Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (CCFs) = what a person would do in a possible circumstance that doesn't actually happen
      • Free knowledge = knowledge of what He decides to create
    • The Molinist picture of creation:
      • God begins with natural knowledge
      • He decides to create
      • He accesses middle knowledge to determine what each person would do in every possible circumstance (i.e., He looks at the CCFs)
      • He chooses to create a world with all the circumstances such that all the people He wants to predestine for salvation use their free will to choose salvation
      • God creates
      • God has free knowledge of what He chose
  • Adapting Molinism for the Problem of Evil
    • Evil is a part of all the worlds where the elect choose salvation
      • Possible addition: God chooses the most people to get saved possible
    • God creates only as much evil as is necessary for the incomparable good of salvation
  • Objections to Molinism
    • O1 (Open Theists): free will can't be known ahead of time because then it is determined
      • R1: it is determined by the agent, which is exactly what free will is
    • O2 (Grounding Objection): there is nothing outside of God to make these CCFs true
      • This is especially concerning since these are contingent truths
  • Objections to Molinism used to explain the Problem of Evil
    • Before God created, all the people that currently exist were only possible people
    • It was possible for those people to choose other than they did at any point
    • So, there was also a possible person identical to each person that exists, only who chose only things that would avoid evil/lead to salvation
    • If God had only allowed evil as a necessary condition for good/salvation, then He would have just created these other possible people and avoided evil in the first place

The Not-Good God Response to the Problem of Evil

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How could a good God allow evil? This whole problem would go away if God wasn’t totally good. But, is that reasonable?

NOTES

  • Problem of Evil
    • 1. If God exists, then He could prevent evil
      • S1: He is all-powerful and all-knowing
    • 2. If God exists, then He would prevent evil
      • S1: He is all-good
    • So, 3. If God exists, then evil doesn’t exist
    • 4. Evil exists
    • So, 5. God doesn’t exist
  • The Evil God Response
    • God is not all good
    • So, the support argument for (2) is false
    • O1: this is an atheist position, not a theist position
      • R1: “God is evil” assumes God exists
      • R2: if “God is evil” is true, then the only reason to believe (2) is false, so the Problem of Evil fails
    • O2: God has no reason to be evil
      • 1. If God exists, then He is eternal and brought everything out of nothing
      • 2. So, if God exists, then He must be all-powerful, all-knowing, self-sufficient, etc.
      • 3. Evil actions are the result of a deficiency of some kind (e.g., temptation, corruption)
      • 4. So, God doesn’t commit evil actions
    • O3: God is the arbiter of good and evil
      • 1. What is good/evil for a thing is determined by what the thing is
      • 2. God invents what everything is
      • 3. So, God determines what is good/evil for everything
      • 4. But, nothing does the same for God
      • 5. So, God cannot be said to be evil like this
      • R1: this means God can’t be said to be good either
        • O1: God can be said to be good in an analogical sense since He determines what is good

Euthyphro Dilemma 3: The False Dilemma Response

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The Euthyphro Dilemma was posed in Plato’s “Euthyphro.” Adapted for our purposes, it asks what God’s role is in determining what is good and what is evil. Is it that God has no say in the matter but only reinforces what is already so, or is it that God determines what is good or evil? Either choice seems to bring undesirable consequences.

In this video, I explore the possibility that this is a false dilemma. There is a third option that avoids the repercussions of the first two and provides insight into the nature of morality.

NOTES

  • Third way
    • God chooses what is good/evil
    • But God does so according to His nature, which is eternal and never changes
  • S1: Avoids problems of Horn 1
    • God decides, so there is no threat to sovereignty, omniscience, or free will
    • Moral truth is built in to our natures
  • S2: Avoids problems of Horn 2
    • Not arbitrary since it is determined by God's unchanging nature
    • Not non-rational since it is chosen for a reason: according to His nature
  • O1: How can we call God good?
    • R1: analogically, since He determines goodness according to His nature