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Ethics

Divine Motivation Theory

September 21, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

In this video, I interview theologian Chester Delagneau about his version of the metaethical Divine Motivation Theory.

NOTES

Further Reading

Chester Delagneau, "Biblical Ethics"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: divine motivation theory, zagzebski

Chester’s Divine Command Theory

September 2, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

In this video, I interview theologian Chester Delagneau about his version of the metaethical Divine Command Theory.

NOTES

Further Reading

Chester Delagneau, "Biblical Ethics"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: divine command theory, ethics, virtue ethics

Intuitionism: Is ‘good’ indefinable?

August 14, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Intuitionists think that you can't define 'good,' but that you can know basic moral truths through intuition.

NOTES

  • Good is indefinable
    • Some terms have to be this way
      • If every term were defined by other terms, then at least some would be defined in a circle
    • A1 (Moore)
      1. In a definition, the definiendum and definiens are interchangeable
      2. The definiendum 'good' is not interchangeable with any definiens
        • S1: it is always conceivable that the two are not the same
        • E.g., CR: "Good" = "socially acceptable"
          • Is it conceivable that a society accepts what's bad?
          • Yes, you could imagine them accepting anything, and something has to be bad
      3. So, 'good' is indefinable
  • Good is
    • objective
    • real
    • non-natural
  • Self-evident basic moral truths
    • Intuition
      • Not inference
        • A1: is-ought fallacy
          1. Moral reasoning must look like this:
            1. X is Y
            2. So, you ought to do X
            • E.g.,
              • Helping others is socially acceptable
              • So, you ought to help others
          2. This reasoning is invalid
            • It's always possible that (a) is true and (b) is false
          3. So, we can't know basic moral truths through inference
    • Doesn't mean you can't be wrong
      • Modus ponens is self-evident and obvious
      • Modus tollens isn't
        • If Pablo goes surfing, so will Queenie
        • Queenie doesn’t surf
        • Could Pablo go surfing?
        • If he did, then Queenie would go
        • But we just said she doesn't
      • Affirming the consequent seems self-evident, but is false
    • intuition
      • direct intellectual apprehension- we see it directly and can't be wrong
      • Alternatively, intellectual seeming- it seems to be a certain way to us, but that doesn't mean it is that way for sure
        • In the same way as perceptual seemings
  • O1: natures are discovered empirically
    • Water & H2O
    • R1: good is different
      • Concept of water is purely phenomenological, but concept of good isn't like that
  • O2: moral disagreement
    • Trolley problems
      • Switch
      • Fat man
      • Matters which order you hear them in
      • People disagree about answers
    • R1: agreement in the basics
      • Don't harm without cause
      • Just not sure in these cases what considerations outweigh which
      • O1: disagreement in basics
        • Maximize good consequences
        • Set of rules: don't kill fetuses, don't rape, etc.
  • O3: source of intuitions
    • Many moral intuitions come from society
      • See the burning widow video
    • R1: some are universal

Further Reading

G.E. Moore, "Principia Ethica"

W.D. Ross, "The Right and the Good"

H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics"

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, intuitionism

Prescriptivism: Is morality just a bunch of commands?

August 8, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Prescriptivism is the view that any moral claim is really just a command. There is no truth value to moral claims, but that doesn't mean we can't reason morally.

NOTES

Further Reading

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

R.M. Hare, "Freedom and Reason"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, prescriptivism

Emotivism: Are moral judgments just emotional ejaculations?

August 8, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Emotivism is the view that ethical judgments are really just interjections expressing one's feelings about the thing in question.

NOTES

Further Reading

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: emotivism, ethics

Ideal Observer View: Is what’s good what the most rational person wants?

August 6, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

The Ideal Observer View is a form of subjectivism where what is good is determined by whatever a fully informed, totally impartial, rational agent would want to do.

NOTES

Further Reading

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics

Plato on Beauty: Is beauty a real entity?

August 5, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Plato's doctrine of the Forms is famous in philosophy, and like everything else, he believes there is a Form of Beauty. In this video, I explore what that means.

NOTES

Further Reading

Grube, G.M.A. "Plato's Theory of Beauty."

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: aesthetics, plato

Subjectivism: Is right or wrong up to the individual?

August 4, 2022 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Does morality depend on the individual?

NOTES

Further Reading

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: ethics, subjective, subjectivism

Should we kill off the weak?

July 25, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

This week we have been considering a view called ethical egoism and I gave you the example of the Plank of Carneades. When I give this dilemma in class, sometimes my students will argue for the egoistic choice by noting that in the moment of choice your survival instinct would kick in. You would naturally want to fight off the other person and giving up the plank would be unnatural. The implication is that things that are natural are good.

This style of argument is similar to what is given by a different but somewhat related system of morality. Evolutionary ethics is the view that we have a moral obligation to aid the evolution of our species. Natural selection hones the human race to be ever more adept at survival. To fight against this could only serve to weaken our race, and this is surely a bad thing. The human race naturally progresses towards a greater goal, so it would be wrong to interfere. However, living in a society instead of in nature creates an artificial environment in which evolution is stymied. Therefore, we should try to correct this as much as possible.

If this sounds at all familiar it should: this is the logic employed by the Nazis. Typically when someone compares something to Image result for nazi propagandathe Nazis, they do so fallaciously (a phenomenon documented here). In logic, a ‘false analogy’ is reasoning that just because two things are similar in one way, they must be similar in an unrelated way. This is exactly how much politicking goes on. I’ve heard people say (and I’m not endorsing anyone), “President Trump distrusts the press. You know who else had a problem with the press? Hitler.” A couple years back it was, “President Obama blames the rich for the problems in America. You know who else blamed a group of people? Hitler.”  The problem is that, just because someone is similar to Hitler in one way doesn’t mean they are similar to him in other, objectionable ways . Otherwise, we could say, “President Lincoln drank water. You know who else drank water?” However, in the case of evolutionary ethics, we are no longer appealing to irrelevant similarities. The Nazis reasoned that the weak would die off naturally but due to artificial circumstances (society) they survive. Worse, they are allowed to breed and thereby pollute the gene pool. The obvious conclusion is that they should not be allowed to survive. So, the Nazis euthanized them (for a gnarly example of what this would be like, watch season 2 of The Man in the High Castle, but not before reading the excellent book by my favorite author, Philip K. Dick.

Hopefully, you haven’t found the Nazi case too convincing because it is logically fallacious. Appeal to Nature is a fallacy on which we assume something is good just because it is natural (for our purposes, assume “natural” means “occurs without human engineering”). So, for example, in the movie “Friday,” Smokey says weed is from the Earth, implying it is good because it is natural. You know what else comes from the Earth? Lead. Does that mean you should shoot yourself (this isn’t a proof that marijuana is bad, but this argument certainly is)? When the evolutionary ethicist appeals to the “nature” part of natural Image result for drowningselection, she is making the same assumption. Even if evolution happens in nature, so does murder. That doesn’t make murder good.

The same should be said about the way my aforementioned students argued. They said that since we naturally have a survival instinct, we should employ that instinct. Again, just because something happens in nature, doesn’t mean it’s good. You may want to kill in order to survive, but that doesn’t mean you should. In fact, we have all kinds of natural desires we should avoid. We naturally desire to hit people, take things that aren’t ours, and eat the M&M’s out of the trail mix so dad is left with peanuts and salt-caked raisins. But we shouldn’t.

Filed Under: Ethics Tagged With: appeal to nature, egoism, ethical egoism, ethics, evolutionary ethics, hitler, informal fallacies, logic, natural, nature, nazis, philip k. dick, philosophy, survival

Ethical Egoism

July 24, 2019 by The Philosurfer Leave a Comment

Filed Under: Egoism, Ethics

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