Metaphysics

Are thoughts just neurons? Mind→Brain Reduction

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Assume the mind exists: is it anything more than the brain? The brain is responsible for so much in the mind, it’s hard to see how the two are separable. But then again, the brain is a material object—can the mind be material?

NOTES

  • Mind→brain reduction
    • 1. The mind exists
    • 2. But it is nothing more than the brain
  • A1: the brain affects the mind
    • S1: (Phineas Gage) brain affects personality
      • O1: psychological explanations
    • S2: brain affects abilities like language-use
      • O1: affects the mind’s ability to use the brain, not the mind
    • S3: (alcohol) brain induces emotions and experiences
  • O1: your brain doesn’t turn into the thing in your mind
    • 1. assume: The mind is nothing but the brain
    • 2. The brain is material
    • 3. So, the mind is material
    • 4. But, the mind is not material
      • S1: qualities in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can see neon purple, but there is nowhere in your brain that is physically neon purple
      • S2: objects in the mind don’t exist materially
        • E.g., you can perceive a truck in your mind, but it doesn’t exist in your brain materially
      • S3: we can think about things that aren’t physically present
      • S4: we can think about things that don’t physically exist
    • A possible response to this objection is to adopt property dualism, which we will look at soon

Logical Behaviorism: Is “the mind” just shorthand for behaviors?

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Logical behaviorism is the idea that the mind and all its psychological states are nothing more than the behaviors we associate with them. If this is true, the mind-body problem seems easy to solve, but can behaviors always match up with psychological states? 

NOTES

  • Logical Behaviorism
    • Psychological states are not non-physical entities
    • Psychological states are real
    • Psychological states are just the behaviors we associate with them
      • S1: we ascribe psychological states to others based on their behaviors
      • Radical reduction
        • Psychological states as we think of them don’t really exist
          • Same as eliminitavism
        • But we can use the vocabulary of psychological states to describe behaviors
          • Different from eliminativism
  • O1: psychological states cause behaviors
    • “Debora looks like that because thinks her boyfriend is distracted.”
    • Translation: “Debora looks like that because she looks like that.”
  • O2: multiple psychological states assigned the same behavior
    • Belief and desire are interconnected in a way that behavior can’t account for
    • “Yutaro believes he sees is a pigeon.”
    • ‘believes’ is a psychological state
    • Translation: Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal
    • You can believe this without reaching towards the flying animal
    • Must add: “Yutaro is reaching out to touch the flying animal because he wants to touch a pigeon.”
    • ‘want’ is a psychological state
    • Translation: “Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal because Yutaro is reaching out towards a flying animal”
  • O3: psychological states are not isomorphic with associated behaviors
    • S1: multiple psychological states assigned to one behavior (belief-desire objection)
    • S2: behavior w/o psychological states (super actors)
    • S3: psychological states w/o behavior (super Spartans)
  • O4: others would have better access to your psychological states than you would

Eliminativism: Is “mind” just a pre-neuroscience word?

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The mind-body problem asks whether or not we have a mind distinct from our brain. Eliminativists argue that the idea of a mind is a pre-scientific entity that has been superseded by neuroscience. In this video, I review the main eliminativist argument and it’s objections.

NOTES

  • Mind-body Problem
    • Brain is material; mind seems immaterial
    • What is really real?
      • The brain only?
      • The mind only?
      • The brain and the mind?
      • Neither?
  • The Eliminativist Argument
    • 1. When belief in an entity is solely the result of a folk theory that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory, you should stop believing in that entity
    • 2. Belief in the mind is the result of a folk theory (folk psychology) that has been superseded by a valid scientific theory (neuroscience)
    • 3. So, we should stop believing the mind exists
    • O1: I posit other minds b/c of direct observation of my own
    • O2: I have direct access to my experiences right now, regardless of whether I posited them as a theory or not
      • R1: you are not having an experience at all; this is just an illusion
        • O1: an illusion is an experience

Are groups real?

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Teamwork makes the dream work, but what makes the team? Is it just the players? Coaches? Owners? Is it the name or the logo? Any answer we give will have interesting consequences. Check out the video for more!

Supertasks

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The idea of an infinite is paradoxical, but what if we can apply that paradox back on itself? A supertask is an infinite task that’s accomplished in a finite amount of time by dividing that time infinitely. Would that solve all out problems? Or is it cheating?