Metaphysics

The Liberalism Objection to Functionalism

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Functionalism is the idea that the thing that makes psychological discourse true is that there is something with the same functional organization as the mind, where the mind is understood as an abstract theory rather than a real thing. The Liberalism Objection claims that there are counterexamples to this idea. The most interesting counterexample is Ned Block's Chinese Brain thought experiment.

NOTES

  • Important presuppositions:
    1. Psychological physicalism
    2. Psychological discourse is true for humans
    3. MRT: Psychological discourse is true for a set of non-human things, too
    4. Psychological discourse is false or meaningless for the compliment of that set
  • Functionalism: the same functional organization
    • Definitions:
      • c-mind: common sense mind
        • what people typically mean by mind
        • not identical to the brain
      • f-mind: functionalist mind
        • anything that has the same functional organization as the c-mind
    1. (Psychological physicalism) The c-mind is fictional
    2. But, the fiction has a structure/functional organization to it
    3. The human brain has the same functional organization as the c-mind
    4. So, by definition, it has an f-mind
    5. When we use the word mind, we should mean f-mind
    6. So, humans have a mind
    • Arguments for (5)
      • A1: it's useful
        • We have certain goals as humans that we don't as sacks of atoms
      • O1 (Liberalism Objection): other things could realize that same functional organization that we wouldn’t say have a mind
        • S1: Chinese brain
        • R1: technically, it is a mind
          • O1: from pragmatic definition
            1. The word 'mind' was defined pragmatically
            2. For the same word to apply, it must be useful in the same way
            3. But, it would not be useful to identify the Chinese brain as having a mind
            4. If it's not useful to claim the Chinese brain has a mind, but it has an f-mind, then having an f-mind isn't sufficient for having a mind
          • O2: redefining words leads to confusion
      • O2: the headache

Further Reading

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

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This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading

Functionalism

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Functionalism is a view in philosophy of mind that attempts to resolve the Multiple Realizability Theorem with psychological physicalism.

NOTES

Functionalism

  1. Psychological physicalism: In philosophy of mind, only physical things exist
  2. Psychological discourse (terms relating to the mind like "want" or "pain") refer to whatever takes an input and assigns an output
    1. E.g., "I want to surf" refers to whatever in me takes the input "seeing good waves" and assigns the output "go surfing"
    2. E.g., "I am in pain" refers to whatever in me takes the input "gets pinched" and assigns the output "winces and says ouch"
  3. MRT: The same functional organization can be 'realized by' multiple different physical systems
    • functional organization- a complete description of all the input-output assignments done by a "mind"
  4. So, the same mind state can be in very different beings
  5. Psychological discourse covers a wide range of things in a way that physical discourse can't
  6. So, Non-reductivism: Psychological discourse can't be done away with in favor of physical discourse, even though the things mentioned in psychological discourse aren't real
  • O1: the same psychological state can be realized by different functional organizations

Further Reading

Hilary Putnam has a lot of his work on this subject collected in Philosophical Papers volume 2: Mind, Language, and Reality.

Multiple Realizability Argument

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Reductivism is the claim that descriptions of the mind should be done away with in favor of descriptions of the brain. The Multiple Realizability Argument rejects reductivism because the same mind-state can be realized by multiple physical states. This video explores exactly what that means and how philosophers argue for it.

NOTES

  • Multiple Realizability Argument
    • realizable- an abstract description is made true by more ordinary objects
    1. Reductivism (reductive physicalism): Psychological categories can and should be replaced by physical categories
    2. So, there is a one-to-one correspondence between psychological categories and physical categories
    3. MRT: A mental state can be "realized by" or made true by more than one physical state
    4. So, there isn't a one-to-one correspondence
    5. So, reductivism is false
    • Identity Theory entails reductivism, so it's false
  • Arguing about MRT
    • A1: biology
      1. Psychological states--minds--are an adaptive advantage
      2. It is likely aliens evolved on other planets
      3. So, it’s likely aliens have minds
      4. If aliens exist, then it's likely they evolved using different stuff
      5. So, it is likely aliens have minds like ours with different physical brains
      • O1: (2) is wild
      • O2: (1) is false
        • Reactions are adaptive advantages, not psychological states
    • A2: AI
      • O1: appeal to the future
      • O2: Chinese room
    • A3: brain plasticity
      • O1: different types of regions in the brain--this isn't possible for the mind
    • A4: conceivable
      • S1: Robots
      • S2: gaseous creatures
      • S3: brain prosthetics
    • O1: not fine grained enough
      • R1: implausible that the brain will match up perfectly like that

 

Further Reading

Identity Theory of Mind

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What if the mind is identical to the brain in the way that water is identical to H2O? Could it be the case that two things that are so conceptually different in reality could be the same?

NOTES

  • contingent identity- two things are conceptually distinct, but actually identical
  • Identity theory = the mind is contingently identical to the brain & is reducible to the brain
    • A1 (J.J.C. Smart): Ockham's razor
      1. The world is consists of physical things
      2. The mind is a different kind of entity
      3. We should avoid positing different kinds of entities
      4. So, we shouldn't posit the mind
      • O1: it would be simpler to deny the existence of the physical instead of the mental
      • O2: simplicity isn't a good test for truth
      • O3: ontological simplicity sacrifices theoretical simplicity
    • A2 (David Lewis): theory model of mind
      1. The mind is a theory to explain behavior
      2. The brain is a theory to explain behavior
      3. Causal completeness principle favors brain theory
        • A1: inductive generalization from past scientific success implies physicalism
          • O1: inductive arguments can't be used to disprove the existence of entities
        • A2: conservation laws of physics
          • O1: hylomorphism doesn't violate conservation laws
          • O2: natural laws are descriptive, not prescriptive
        • A3: methodological presupposition
          • O1: unnecessary presupposition
      4. So, brain theory trumps mind theory
      • O1: the existence of a mind isn't a theory, but a datum of experience

Further Reading

For Smart's use of Ockham's Razor, see his ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ in Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156 (1959)

For Lewis' argument, see ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25 (1966).

For more on George Berkeley's argument for idealism, see his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

For more on David Hume's view of causation, read his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

 

The Conceivability Argument

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The Conceivability Argument attempts to show that the mind is possibly distinct from the brain because we can conceive of the two separately. This argument is then used in the Modal Argument to show they are actually distinct. In this video, I'll explore questions about whether we actually are conceiving of the two as separate, and whether conceivability entails possibility.

NOTES

Further Reading

Most of this can be found in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

The Modal Argument

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The Modal Argument is an argument that the mind must be a distinct thing from the brain. The idea is that identity is a necessary property, but the mind and brain could possibly be distinct, so they must not be identical.

NOTES

  • physicalism- only physical things exist
    • physical- describable/explainable by physics
    • Types of physicalism
      • ontological physicalism- everything that exists is physical
      • psychological physicalism- the mind is physical
  • Modal Argument
    1. A thing is necessarily identical to itself
    2. So, if the mind and brain are the same thing, then they are necessarily the same
    3. It's possible that the mind and brain not be the same
    4. So, the mind and the brain are not the same
      • By (2), (3); (rule of modal logic)
  • Arguments for premise (3) of the Modal Argument
    • A1: Conceivability Argument
      1. What is conceivable is possible
      2. It's conceivable that we exist apart from our brains
        • S1: dreams
        • S2 (Descartes): brain in a vat/evil genius demon
        • S3: NDEs
      3. So it's possible that our minds are separate from our brains
    • A2 (Descartes): Essential Property Argument
      1. Everything has one essential property that makes it what it is
        • O1 (existentialists): there are no essential properties, only existence
          • R1: implausible
        • O2: there is no reason there couldn't be more than one essential property
      2. For us, it is our thinking alone
        • S1: methodological doubt
          1. In all those other examples, we can doubt whether our bodies exist or not
          2. We can't doubt whether the doubter exists
          3. So, this must be our essential property
        • O3: we don't always think
          • R1: our essential property is our capacity to think
            • O1: psychological physicalists believe the mind's capacity to think is the brain
      3. So, we can exist even if our bodies don't

Further Reading

Most of this can be found in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Could the mental be physical?

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The brain is obviously physical, but what about the mind? It seems like it shouldn't be, but maybe we're just looking at the idea od physical wrong.

NOTES

  • What does 'physical' mean?
    • P1: 'physical' means 'spatial'
      • I.e., extended in space; has a volume
      • O1: photons are physical, but not spatial
    • P2: 'physical' means 'material'
      • I.e., made out of matter
      • O1: energy is physical, but not material
    • P3: 'physical' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of physics'
  • What does 'mental' mean?
    • P1: 'mental' means 'describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology'
  • Argument for why the mental can't be physical
    1. Physical things are describable and explainable using the concepts of physics
    2. Mental things are describable and explainable using the concepts of psychology
    3. So, mental things are not physical things
    • O1: the same thing can be described and explained in different ways given the purpose of the scientist
      • S1: biologists and physicists explain and describe the same thing using their own sciences
      • N1: this only proves the mental and physical are not necessarily mutually exclusive, not that the mental is physical
    • O2: four-term fallacy

Further Reading

For more on René Descartes' definition of 'physical' as 'spatial,' read his Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Can we see the mind?

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Extreme empiricism claims we shouldn’t believe in what we can’t observe. If the mind is unobservable, should we disbelieve it exists? What if we could see the mind? What would that be like?

NOTES

  • A1: From Extreme Empiricism
    • 1. We should only believe in what is observable (in principle, by our equipment, etc.)
    • 2. The mind is in no way observable
    • ∴3. We shouldn’t believe in the mind
  • Support for premise 2
    • A1: observation requires physicality
      • 1. Perception requires sense organs, a thing to be sensed, and possibly a medium
      • 2. All of these are physical
      • ∴3. No non-physical thing can be observed
      • O1: begs the question that all observation must be like ours
    • A2: the mind is first person
      • O1: mind-vision
        • Camera that can capture 100% of your brain structure and activity in real time
        • Interprets it into what that person is seeing
        • Then projects it onto a screen
        • R1: the mind is never observed; this is just an interpretation of the brain
    • O2: you directly observe your own mind
      • R1: this isn’t shared with others, so we can’t check the veracity
        • O1: content of perception is dubitable, not the existence of the perception
        • O2: in order to get agreement from others, we must rely on our experience of them
        • O3: verification assumes others are having perceptual experience
      • R2: Illusion objection
        • O1: illusion is nothing but psychological state
  • Corollary: The only thing we can be sure exists is the mind
    • The existence of the brain and body assumes the reliability (and therefore existence) of sense perception (i.e., the mind)