Metaphysics

The Difference Argument

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The Difference Argument is used by dualists to show that the mind has properties the brain doesn't and is therefore a different kind of thing.

NOTES

  1. If the mind and some part of the brain, B, are identical, then the mind and B must have all properties in common
  2. The mind has a property, F, and B lacks F
    • S1: intentional aspect of thought
    • S2: sensations
    • S3: first-person experience
    • S4: unity of consciousness
      1. People have a united conscious experience
      2. Complex things cannot have a united consciousness
        • S1: consciousness is not additive
        • S2: a set is not a thing, so it doesn't have properties
      3. A simple physical thing does not have a united consciousness
        • O1: there could be a CPU in the brain that is the locus of all awareness
          • R1: there is no evidence that brains work this way and good evidence they don’t
          • R2: such a module would be complex, leading this argument to regress back to a simple physical particle with united consciousness, which would be strange
      4. So, mind has a property the body doesn’t
  3. So, the mind and B are not identical
  4. So, dualism is true

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Emergentism: Does the mind emerge from the brain?

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In this video, I explore the idea of emergentism as exposited by John Searle.

NOTES

  1. Four assumptions are made in the mind-body problem that must be jettisoned
    1. Assumption: ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ name mutually exclusive ontological categories
      1. Descartes: physical = matter = spatially extended
        • O1: excludes things modern physics accepts as matter
      2. Searle: physical  =
        1. located in space and time
        2. causally explainable by microphysics
        3. function causally
      3. On Searle's definition, there is no reason mental cannot be physical
    2. Assumption: there is only one kind of reduction
      1. ontological reduction: x is ontologically reducible to y = x is real, but is identical to some more fundamental entity, y
      2. causal reduction: x is weakly/causally reducible to y = x is not identical to y, but all of the intrinsic facts about x are explained by (or caused by) facts about y
      3. emergent properties/system-level functions = novel properties of a system that the parts lack which emerge when the system is properly organized
    3. Assumption: causation is always a relation between discrete events ordered in time, where cause precedes effect
      1. discrete causation = occurs between two discreet objects and is ordered in time where cause precedes effect
      2. nondiscrete causation = emergent properties causing and being caused by parts in an arrangement
        1. bottom-up = parts cause the emergent property
        2. top-down = emergent property affects something about the parts
    4. Assumption: identity is unproblematic; everything is identical with itself and nothing else; paradigms of identity are object identities and identities of composition
      1. object identity = two objects are actually just the same one object
      2. identity of composition = a thing is identical to the parts that compose it
      3. Emergent things can be totally dependent on their parts without being identical to them
  2. biological naturalism = sensations and thoughts are system-level features of neurophysiological processes in the CNS
  3. So, sensations and thoughts are causally reducible to and emergent from neurophysiological processes in the CNS
  • C1: frees naturalist from problems of reduction, supervenience, or elimination of psychological phenomena that fly in the face of common experience
  • O1: ad hoc
    • R1: the same emergent properties are found in all kinds of natural systems
  1. Conscious states match Searle’s criteria for physicality
    1. They are located in space and time (i.e., the brain)
    2. They are causally explainable by microphysics (i.e., reducible to neurophysiological processes)
    3. They have physical effects (i.e., downward causation on the brain)
  2. Conscious states are not strictly identical to neurophysiological bases, but all their powers are extensions of the latter, so they are not independent things
  3. So, this is only a pseudo-problem
  4. The only questions left are how the brain does this, which is the job of neuroscience
  • O1: the problem of psycho-physical emergence
    • When any other property of an object emerges, it makes sense how it does so
      • Structural emergence
        • The particles that make up a tire aren't round, but when they come together the property of roundness emerges
        • However, when you look at the laws of nature and the particles, you can understand why the particles cause roundness to emerge
          • You can see how they necessitate it
      • Quantitative emergence
        • Consider a kid’s choir, where each kid is singing softly, but the whole choir is very loud. Has this brought something into reality?
        • Is this mysterious at all?
        • What causes the new property?
    • The emergence of consciousness from brain matter does not make sense
      • We have made tremendous progress in neuroscience
      • By now, we should have some semblance of an idea, but it's not even close
    • The emergence of consciousness from brain matter isn't even intelligible
      • Galen Strawson
      • What makes emergence intelligible is this
      • Take the thing that emerges and that which it emerges from
      • You should be able to characterize them both--describe them both--using conceptually homogeneous concepts
        • Shape of the atoms and shape of the tire
        • Motion of the atoms and motion of the tire
      • No set of conceptually homogeneous concepts could capture both the experiential and the non-experiential
        • Shape of the brain and…what? Shape of consciousness?
        • Electrons in motion and first person experience of red?
    • O1: brute emergence
      • R1: We can't say "It just does"
        • We want to say one thing emerges from another,
        • There must be something about the thing it emerges from which is sufficient for the thing to emerge
        • But this is something would be our explanation that we’re lacking

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Panpsychism: Does everything have a mind?

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Panpsychism is the view that "everything has a mind." In this video, I look at arguments for and against this view

NOTES

  • panpsychism- “everything has a mind”
    • Not that everything can think, but everything has some level of consciousness
    • Not necessarily that every single object has consciousness, but at least the building blocks
  • A1: Problem of Psychophysical Emergence
  • A2: The Intrinsic Nature Argument
    1. Physical objects are known by their extrinsic nature
    2. This doesn't tell us about the intrinsic nature of these objects
    3. Science can only tell us about the extrinsic nature of physical objects
    4. So, science is an incomplete picture of the world
    5. Panpsychist has a proposal: the intrinsic nature of matter is, at least in part, consciousness
  • A3: “simplicity argument” in favor of panpsychism
    • The intrinsic nature of at least some matter is consciousness-involving: namely the matter of brains 
    • This is perhaps our only real clue as to the intrinsic nature of matter in general
    • O1: hasty generalization
  • O1: Deeply counterintuitive
  • O2: The Combination Problem
    • James: Very difficult to make sense of: “little” conscious subjects of experience with their micro-experiences coming together to form a “big” conscious subject with its own experiences
      • Imagine there are a billion conscious particles
      • Push them all together into a brain shape
      • A human consciousness arises
      • That human consciousness would not be a case of additive emergence like the quiet voices making a loud sound
      • It would just be an entirely new consciousness
      • You'd now have 1 billion and 1 consciousnesses
      • In general, a mind isn't something you add up to
    • The Subject-Summing Problem
      • 1. Each subject has a viewpoint that excludes the viewpoints of all other subjects
      • 2. If my point of view and your point of view were to be combined into an “uber-mind”, then that uber-mind would have to have both your experiences to the exclusion of all other experiences and my experiences to the exclusion of all other experiences
      • 3. This seems flatly contradictory
      • Adapted zombie argument
        1. Assume: conceivability = possibility
        2. We can conceive of a human with all its parts being conscious, yet the human not conscious itself
        3. So, it's possible for the parts to be conscious without the self being conscious
        4. If the parts can be conscious without giving rise to the self being conscious, then something else must be causing the self to be conscious
        5. So, panpsychism is false

Further Reading

Epiphenomenalism: Is our mind a byproduct of our brain?

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Epiphenomenalism is a version of property dualism that claims the mind is a byproduct of the brain that is causally inert. In this video, I discuss what that means and some objections to it.

NOTES

Our physical properties generate our mental properties

Emergent mental phenomena are causally inert

O1: counterintuitive

O2: problem of psychophysical emergence

O3: arguments for substance dualism over property dualism

Further Reading

What is dualism?

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In this video, I explain what dualism is, the difference between property and substance dualism, the difference between different kinds of substance dualisms (including Cartesian dualism), and motivations for and against being a dualist.

NOTES

Motivations for and against

  • A1: the mind is the center of personhood, which is not material
    • S1: material body constantly changes, person remains the same
    • S2: personhood isn't quantifiable like matter
  • A2: thinking seems prima facie to be immaterial
    • R1: the brain has a causal effect on thinking
      • O1: damaged equipment
  • A3: sense of transcendence
  • A4: religious
  • O1: makes minds sound like ghosts in a shell
  • O2: doesn’t neuroscience explain everything going on in thinking?
  • O3: mind sounds like soul, and soul is religion
  • O4: scientism

Further Reading

Agency Arguments: Do reasoning and moral choice prove you have a nonphysical mind?

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Rational agency is what we call our reasoning ability, and it seems to be different from mimicry, but the two aren't physically different. This seems to show we are non-physical. Moral agency is our faculty for deliberating between goods. Again, this seems physically identical to mimicry, so its existence seems to show we are non-physical.

The Intentionality Argument

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Our thoughts are about things, a property we call intentionality. Material objects do not exhibit intentionality. In this video, I consider the possibility that this shows our minds are immaterial.

NOTES

THE INTENTIONALITY ARGUMENT

  1. Thoughts have intentionality
  2. Material things don't have intentionality
  3. So, thoughts are not material things
  • O1: causal view of intentionality
    • R1: non-existent causes (e.g., unicorn)
      • O1: these are just existent causes mixed together (e.g., unicorn = horn + horse)
        • R1: the concept may be caused by existent causes, but the content of the thought isn't of those existent causes
    • R2: different causes, same content
    • R3: same cause, different content
    • R4: reducing intentionality to an object ipso facto loses the 'aboutness' necessary for intentionality
  • O2 (Dennett): intentionality has no explanatory power so we shouldn't posit it
    • R1: it isn't something posited to explain, but something observed and in need of explaining

 

Qualia Arguments

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Qualia arguments intend to show that the mind must be at least partially immaterial due to our qualitative experiences that can't be identified in the material brain. In this video I review three major kinds--the Bat Argument, Mary the Scientist, and the Zombie Argument--as well as objections to these arguments.

NOTES

Qualia Arguments

  1. Qualia are immaterial mental properties that exist
    • S1: qualia like the experience of echolocation or color are not located in the brain
    • S2: in a different possible world, a physical brain could exist without qualia
  2. Therefore, the mind is an existent immaterial entity
  • O1: reducible
    • S1: water & H2O
    • R1: water is made up of H2O, but neurons aren't made up of qualia
  • O2 (Andrew Melnyk): conceptually distinct descriptions, doesn't prove non-identity
    • S1: amnesiac
    • R1: the point isn't epistemological, but ontological
  • O3 (Daniel Dennett): qualia are confused
    • R1: a confused experience is still experience
  • O4: qualia are theoretically effete in explaining behavior
    • O1: qualia are the data to be explained
  • O5: no one can accurately define qualia
    • R1: mental ostensive definition

A further reply can be given to Objection 1: We initially conceive of H2O apart from water, but with further investigation realize that H2O must be water, so we can't conceive of the two apart from each other. The same strategy won't work for qualia, though, because water is how H2O appears to us vs. how it appears under a microscope. Qualia are not how the brain appears to us, but appearance itself.

The Chinese Room Argument

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Could computers think? Could robots have minds? The Chinese Room Argument, devised by John Searle, is a thought experiment meant to show that computers can't have minds, no matter how good technology gets. The amount of debate this thought experiment has garnered has been enormous, and it has proven to be one of the most fascinating ideas in philosophy. In this video, I explain the Chinese Room Argument and five major replies to it.

NOTES

  • Definitions
    • understands: Whatever it is we're referring to when, before we start doing philosophy and thinking about it, we say "X understands Y"
    • X p-understands Y: "X runs a program that always produces a set of behaviors B we associate with understanding that thing Y"
    • Program- a list of rules for what to do
    • r-understands:
      • 'Understands' includes one or more of the following:
        • Qualitative aspect: A feeling of understanding
        • Conscious aspect: Awareness of understanding and how you are using it
        • Intentional aspect: Content of understanding as we experience it
    • x Ci-understands y: x produces the same behaviors as someone who understands y and this behavior begins with a causal connection from y to x
    • x X-understands y: x has the same complexity as the brain of a person that understands y
  • Strong AI
    1. (Computational theory of mind) Understanding is nothing more than p-understanding
    2. A computer can p-understand (Chinese)
    3. So, a computer can understand (Chinese)
    • O1: The Chinese Room Argument
      1. If (1), then we can't p-understand without understanding
      2. I can p-understand (Chinese) without understanding (Chinese)
        • S1: Chinese Room
          • I don't understand Chinese
          • In the middle of the room is:
            • boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base)
            • a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program)
          • People outside the room send in other Chinese symbols: questions in Chinese (the input)
          • By following the instructions in the program I pass the Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output)
          • I p-understand Chinese
          • So, I p-understand Chinese w/ understanding Chinese, which is (5)
      3. So, ~(1)
      4. The only thing a computer can do is p-understand
      5. So, a computer can't understand
      • R1: Systems Reply
        • I am not the whole system here, but more like the cpu of the computer
        • So, me not understanding is irrelevant
        • The system as a whole understands, and that's what counts
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Argument
          • Memorize the rules, then there's only one physical system
          • R1: Virtual Mind Reply
            • There is a virtual mind working the program
            • O1: there is only one physical system
      • R2: Robot reply
        • Include Ci-understanding
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Use digital readouts of cameras and this satisfies Ci-understanding without true understanding
      • R3: Brain Simulator Reply
        • Make a computer that takes natural-language as inputs and runs a program identical to a human brain that understands Chinese
        • Add X-understanding
        • O1: Supergenius Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Increase complexity of the Chinese Room program too
        • O2 (Searle): the water valve brain
      • R4: Other Minds
        1. We attribute understanding to other people because of their behavior
        2. Robots and aliens share the same behavior
        3. So, we should attribute understanding to robots and aliens
        • N1: this is R-understanding
        • S1: pragmatic reasons
          • O1: anthropomorphizing is useful, but metaphoric
      • R5: Intuition Reply
        1. The Chinese Room Argument is based on intuition
        2. Intuition is unreliable in metaphysics
        3. Computational Theory of Mind has explanatory power
        4. We should believe in things that have the most explanatory power
        5. So, we should trust Computational Theory of Mind over the Chinese Room Argument
        • O1: framing CRA in the first person appeals to observation, not intuition

Further Reading