The Philosurfer

Functionalism

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Functionalism is a view in philosophy of mind that attempts to resolve the Multiple Realizability Theorem with psychological physicalism.

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Functionalism

  1. Psychological physicalism: In philosophy of mind, only physical things exist
  2. Psychological discourse (terms relating to the mind like "want" or "pain") refer to whatever takes an input and assigns an output
    1. E.g., "I want to surf" refers to whatever in me takes the input "seeing good waves" and assigns the output "go surfing"
    2. E.g., "I am in pain" refers to whatever in me takes the input "gets pinched" and assigns the output "winces and says ouch"
  3. MRT: The same functional organization can be 'realized by' multiple different physical systems
    • functional organization- a complete description of all the input-output assignments done by a "mind"
  4. So, the same mind state can be in very different beings
  5. Psychological discourse covers a wide range of things in a way that physical discourse can't
  6. So, Non-reductivism: Psychological discourse can't be done away with in favor of physical discourse, even though the things mentioned in psychological discourse aren't real
  • O1: the same psychological state can be realized by different functional organizations

Further Reading

Hilary Putnam has a lot of his work on this subject collected in Philosophical Papers volume 2: Mind, Language, and Reality.

Multiple Realizability Argument

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Reductivism is the claim that descriptions of the mind should be done away with in favor of descriptions of the brain. The Multiple Realizability Argument rejects reductivism because the same mind-state can be realized by multiple physical states. This video explores exactly what that means and how philosophers argue for it.

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  • Multiple Realizability Argument
    • realizable- an abstract description is made true by more ordinary objects
    1. Reductivism (reductive physicalism): Psychological categories can and should be replaced by physical categories
    2. So, there is a one-to-one correspondence between psychological categories and physical categories
    3. MRT: A mental state can be "realized by" or made true by more than one physical state
    4. So, there isn't a one-to-one correspondence
    5. So, reductivism is false
    • Identity Theory entails reductivism, so it's false
  • Arguing about MRT
    • A1: biology
      1. Psychological states--minds--are an adaptive advantage
      2. It is likely aliens evolved on other planets
      3. So, it’s likely aliens have minds
      4. If aliens exist, then it's likely they evolved using different stuff
      5. So, it is likely aliens have minds like ours with different physical brains
      • O1: (2) is wild
      • O2: (1) is false
        • Reactions are adaptive advantages, not psychological states
    • A2: AI
      • O1: appeal to the future
      • O2: Chinese room
    • A3: brain plasticity
      • O1: different types of regions in the brain--this isn't possible for the mind
    • A4: conceivable
      • S1: Robots
      • S2: gaseous creatures
      • S3: brain prosthetics
    • O1: not fine grained enough
      • R1: implausible that the brain will match up perfectly like that

 

Further Reading

Ad hominem

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An ad hominem fallacy is an attack on a person rather than their position or argument. Why is this fallacious? How can we identify this fallacy? How do we respond?

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  • ad hominem- attacking the person giving the argument rather than the argument itself
  • Three kinds:
    • circumstantial- attacking a person's circumstances
      • If they stand to gain from winning the argument, that's a reason to evaluate it, not reject it
    • abusive- attacking the person directly
      • Name calling
      • We can evaluate a person's character to see if they are trustworthy as an authority but not to evaluate their argument
    • tu quoque- attacking a person's hypocrisy
      • Hypocrisy doesn't automatically invalidate a person's position/argument, but a person can be a counterexample to their own position if they are living it out but not getting the predicted effect
  • Tips
    • How to identify: Would the response to the argument/position still make sense if we didn't know whose argument/position it was?
    • How to avoid it: Argue to understand others, not to win
    • How to respond to it:
      • Listen first
      • Ask the person to look past you and address the argument

Further Reading

Intellectuals, by Paul Johnson

Identity Theory of Mind

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What if the mind is identical to the brain in the way that water is identical to H2O? Could it be the case that two things that are so conceptually different in reality could be the same?

NOTES

  • contingent identity- two things are conceptually distinct, but actually identical
  • Identity theory = the mind is contingently identical to the brain & is reducible to the brain
    • A1 (J.J.C. Smart): Ockham's razor
      1. The world is consists of physical things
      2. The mind is a different kind of entity
      3. We should avoid positing different kinds of entities
      4. So, we shouldn't posit the mind
      • O1: it would be simpler to deny the existence of the physical instead of the mental
      • O2: simplicity isn't a good test for truth
      • O3: ontological simplicity sacrifices theoretical simplicity
    • A2 (David Lewis): theory model of mind
      1. The mind is a theory to explain behavior
      2. The brain is a theory to explain behavior
      3. Causal completeness principle favors brain theory
        • A1: inductive generalization from past scientific success implies physicalism
          • O1: inductive arguments can't be used to disprove the existence of entities
        • A2: conservation laws of physics
          • O1: hylomorphism doesn't violate conservation laws
          • O2: natural laws are descriptive, not prescriptive
        • A3: methodological presupposition
          • O1: unnecessary presupposition
      4. So, brain theory trumps mind theory
      • O1: the existence of a mind isn't a theory, but a datum of experience

Further Reading

For Smart's use of Ockham's Razor, see his ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ in Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156 (1959)

For Lewis' argument, see ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25 (1966).

For more on George Berkeley's argument for idealism, see his A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

For more on David Hume's view of causation, read his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

 

The Conceivability Argument

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The Conceivability Argument attempts to show that the mind is possibly distinct from the brain because we can conceive of the two separately. This argument is then used in the Modal Argument to show they are actually distinct. In this video, I'll explore questions about whether we actually are conceiving of the two as separate, and whether conceivability entails possibility.

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Further Reading

Most of this can be found in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

Surf in the Time of Coronavirus

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If we strictly follow safety restrictions for Covid-19, then there will have to be some restriction on beach access. So, who gets to surf during the pandemic? In this video, I look at six different philosophies and what they might say about surf during the time of coronavirus.

NOTES

Further Reading

Stab Magazine on the UCSD scientist

The Inertia on Duck, NC

John Locke's view can be found in his Second Treatise of Government

John Rawls' view can be found in his A Theory of Justice

Ronald Dworkin's view can be found in his book Sovereign Virtue

Equivocation

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An equivocation is a shift in meaning of a word. It can lead to invalid arguments and miscommunication. In this video, I discuss exactly how equivocation happens as a fallacy of reasoning and communication. I also give tips on how to spot an equivocation and how to respond to it.

NOTES

Further Reading

Aristotle identifies this fallacy in Sophistical Refutations

Begging the Question

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'Begging the question' (also 'petitio principii') is an informal fallacy of reasoning. In this video, I'll explain what it is, how it relates to circular reasoning, tips on avoiding it, and some common mistakes about it.

NOTES

Here's an example of "begs the question" used incorrectly in a DC Justice League comic by The Flash

Further Reading

Aristotle talks about this in Sophistical Refutations and in Prior Analytics book II.

Whatley's Elements of Logic is interesting for historical reasons, but there are much better logic books now. Read it for free online here. Don't buy it unless you like artifacts.

René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here

 

The Modal Argument

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The Modal Argument is an argument that the mind must be a distinct thing from the brain. The idea is that identity is a necessary property, but the mind and brain could possibly be distinct, so they must not be identical.

NOTES

  • physicalism- only physical things exist
    • physical- describable/explainable by physics
    • Types of physicalism
      • ontological physicalism- everything that exists is physical
      • psychological physicalism- the mind is physical
  • Modal Argument
    1. A thing is necessarily identical to itself
    2. So, if the mind and brain are the same thing, then they are necessarily the same
    3. It's possible that the mind and brain not be the same
    4. So, the mind and the brain are not the same
      • By (2), (3); (rule of modal logic)
  • Arguments for premise (3) of the Modal Argument
    • A1: Conceivability Argument
      1. What is conceivable is possible
      2. It's conceivable that we exist apart from our brains
        • S1: dreams
        • S2 (Descartes): brain in a vat/evil genius demon
        • S3: NDEs
      3. So it's possible that our minds are separate from our brains
    • A2 (Descartes): Essential Property Argument
      1. Everything has one essential property that makes it what it is
        • O1 (existentialists): there are no essential properties, only existence
          • R1: implausible
        • O2: there is no reason there couldn't be more than one essential property
      2. For us, it is our thinking alone
        • S1: methodological doubt
          1. In all those other examples, we can doubt whether our bodies exist or not
          2. We can't doubt whether the doubter exists
          3. So, this must be our essential property
        • O3: we don't always think
          • R1: our essential property is our capacity to think
            • O1: psychological physicalists believe the mind's capacity to think is the brain
      3. So, we can exist even if our bodies don't

Further Reading

Most of this can be found in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy for free here, or get a more recent translation here