The Philosurfer

Qualia Arguments

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Qualia arguments intend to show that the mind must be at least partially immaterial due to our qualitative experiences that can't be identified in the material brain. In this video I review three major kinds--the Bat Argument, Mary the Scientist, and the Zombie Argument--as well as objections to these arguments.

NOTES

Qualia Arguments

  1. Qualia are immaterial mental properties that exist
    • S1: qualia like the experience of echolocation or color are not located in the brain
    • S2: in a different possible world, a physical brain could exist without qualia
  2. Therefore, the mind is an existent immaterial entity
  • O1: reducible
    • S1: water & H2O
    • R1: water is made up of H2O, but neurons aren't made up of qualia
  • O2 (Andrew Melnyk): conceptually distinct descriptions, doesn't prove non-identity
    • S1: amnesiac
    • R1: the point isn't epistemological, but ontological
  • O3 (Daniel Dennett): qualia are confused
    • R1: a confused experience is still experience
  • O4: qualia are theoretically effete in explaining behavior
    • O1: qualia are the data to be explained
  • O5: no one can accurately define qualia
    • R1: mental ostensive definition

A further reply can be given to Objection 1: We initially conceive of H2O apart from water, but with further investigation realize that H2O must be water, so we can't conceive of the two apart from each other. The same strategy won't work for qualia, though, because water is how H2O appears to us vs. how it appears under a microscope. Qualia are not how the brain appears to us, but appearance itself.

Problem of Evil and the Moral Argument

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The Problem of Evil is intended to show that God does not exist, but interestingly enough one of the premises it rests on--indeed, the most surprising one--can be used to prove the exact opposite: the premise that "Evil exists." How can the existence of evil show God exists? Is there a way to avoid this result?

NOTES

The Moral Argument for the Existence of God

  1. If evil exists, then an objective, obligatory standard of being exists
    • A1: analytic truth
  2. If it is obligatory, it was designed by an intelligent agent
    • A1: we are not obliged to standards from non-persons
    • A2: the concept of being wrong assumes the standard was an intentional creation
  3. If it is obligatory and designed by an intelligent agent, that intelligent agent was a creator that endued the obligation
    • A1: avoids the externalist-only regress (and the internalist-only lack of motivation)
  4. So, if evil exists, an intelligent creator exists
  5. Evil exists
    • A1: claimed in the Problem of Evil
      • O1: give up the claim from the Problem of Evil
        • R1: special pleading
      • O2: "If God existed, then this would have been evil."
        • R1: impossible counterfactual
  6. So, an intelligent creator (God) exists
  • O1: entails that atheists can't be moral or that atheists can't have an ethical system
    • R1: this is an argument about what makes the moral system true, not what needs to be believed to be moral or have an ethical system

Further Reading

My version of this argument is similar to that found in Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, though I think an amalgam of DCT and Aristotelian natures is the most convincing grounding of morality.

Argumentum ad Verecundiam: Appeal to Illegitimate Authority

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There are times in the pursuit of any knowledge--science, history, philosophy, etc.--when we have to rely on the testimony of others. What makes someone a reliable authority? In this video, I discuss the difference between legitimate and illegitimate appeals to authority.

NOTES

  • Appeal to authority- accepting the testimony of others as a grounds for belief or possibly knowledge
    • Types:
      • Eye-witness testimony
      • Opinions informed by experience
      • Expert research
  • What makes an authority legitimate?
    • Expertise
      • Conversant with all views on the topic
      • Vote of confidence from colleagues
      • Corroboration
    • Trustworthiness
      • Honest
      • Objective/unbiased
      • Sober-minded
      • Thorough
  • Argumentum ad Verecundiam- Appeal to an illegitimate authority
    • Types:
      • Not an expert in the subject
      • Not reliable
      • The person citing the authority is not reliable
    • Non-experts
      • Experts in other fields
      • Expertise too specified/general for the nature of the question
      • Not an expert at all
        • Internet sources
        • Celebrity appeal
      • Personal experience for general conclusions
    • Not trustworthy/reliable
      • Unreliably biased
      • Liars
    • Unreliable reporting
      • Misunderstanding the expert
      • Misquotation
      • Reporting bias
      • Unnamed experts

Further Reading

Argumentum ad Populam (Popular Appeal)

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The 'argumentum ad populum' fallacy assumes that probability of a belief is increased by the number of people that believe it. This video explores interesting examples of this, especially in democracy.

NOTES

  • argumentum ad populam- assuming that a lot of people believing something is a good reason to think it is more probably true
    • Arguments that this is fallacious reasoning
      • A1: psychological similarity
      • A2: gaslighting
      • A3: groupthink
      • A4: Mandela effect
  • argumentum contra populum- assuming that a lot of people believing something is a good reason to think it is less probably true

Further Reading

A pretty nice list of notes can be found here, though as you might be able to tell from the video I don't really agree with a lot of what is said there.

I also really liked this blog post, especially the discussion on Zeno and calculus (it was a little off topic--but, I mean, I made an entire career by being off topic)

My favorite logic book that deals with material fallacies is Peter Kreeft's Socratic Logic, and I like his discussion of the ad populum, though it's unfortunately short.

Probabilistic Problem of Evil

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The classical Problem of Evil attempts to show God's existence is impossible, but things might be easier if we set our sights a little lower. The Probabilistic Problem of Evil attempts to show that the existence of God is improbable. In this video, I will look at a particular strategy for establishing this, which borrows the predictive methodology used in natural science.

NOTES

  • Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Pre-Skeptical Theism)
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs E
      • Hypothesis I (Hypothesis of Indifference): the universe is the result of indifferent forces
      • State of Affairs E: evil exists
    2. Hypothesis T predicts state of affairs ~E
      • Hypothesis T (Hypothesis of Theism): God created the universe
    3. I and T have equal prior probability
    4. If E obtains, then I is more probable than T
    5. If ~E obtains, then T is more probably than I
    6. E obtains
    7. So, I is more probable than T
    • O1: Skeptical Theism wouldn't predict ~E
  • Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Post-Skeptical Theism)
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs E
    2. Hypothesis S abstains from predicting E or ~E
      • Hypothesis S: Skeptical Theism
    3. I and S have equal prior probability
    4. If E obtains, then I is more probable than it was before
    5. If ~E obtains, then I is less probable than it was before
    6. If either E or ~E obtains, then the probability of S remains unaffected
    7. E obtains
    8. So, I is more probable than S
  •  Probabilistic Problem of Order
    1. Hypothesis I predicts state of affairs ~O
      • State of Affairs O: the universe displays an intelligible order
    2. Hypothesis S predicts state of affairs O
    3. I and S have equal prior probability
    4. If  ~O obtains, then I is more probable than S
    5. If O obtains, then S is more probable than I
    6. O obtains
    7. So, S is more probable than I

Further Reading

C. S. Lewis "The Problem of Pain"

The Megaphone Response to the Logical Problem of Evil

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Assume for the sake of argument that God allows evil for our own good: what if we don't want that? The Megaphone Response holds that the only thing that is truly desirable for us requires us to experience evil, so it's not the case that we don't want God to allow it.

NOTES

Megaphone Response

  1. The things of this world can at best provide temporary, limited happiness
  2. We most deeply desire inexhaustible happiness
  3. So, the things of this world cannot provide what we most deeply desire
  4. Only an eternal, infinitely good, immortal-making being could provide inexhaustible happiness
  5. Only God is an eternal, infinitely good, immortal-making being
  6. So, only God can provide what we most deeply desire
  7. We are easily deceived into futilely pursuing happiness through the things of this world
  8. Evil shocks into disillusionment with the good things in this world and forces us to pursue something different
  9. So, possibly one reason God allows evil is that we need it to refocus on what will truly satisfy our desire for happiness
  • O1: I don't want this disillusionment
    • R1: it's important enough to give anyway

Further Reading

C. S. Lewis "The Problem of Pain"

The Chinese Room Argument

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Could computers think? Could robots have minds? The Chinese Room Argument, devised by John Searle, is a thought experiment meant to show that computers can't have minds, no matter how good technology gets. The amount of debate this thought experiment has garnered has been enormous, and it has proven to be one of the most fascinating ideas in philosophy. In this video, I explain the Chinese Room Argument and five major replies to it.

NOTES

  • Definitions
    • understands: Whatever it is we're referring to when, before we start doing philosophy and thinking about it, we say "X understands Y"
    • X p-understands Y: "X runs a program that always produces a set of behaviors B we associate with understanding that thing Y"
    • Program- a list of rules for what to do
    • r-understands:
      • 'Understands' includes one or more of the following:
        • Qualitative aspect: A feeling of understanding
        • Conscious aspect: Awareness of understanding and how you are using it
        • Intentional aspect: Content of understanding as we experience it
    • x Ci-understands y: x produces the same behaviors as someone who understands y and this behavior begins with a causal connection from y to x
    • x X-understands y: x has the same complexity as the brain of a person that understands y
  • Strong AI
    1. (Computational theory of mind) Understanding is nothing more than p-understanding
    2. A computer can p-understand (Chinese)
    3. So, a computer can understand (Chinese)
    • O1: The Chinese Room Argument
      1. If (1), then we can't p-understand without understanding
      2. I can p-understand (Chinese) without understanding (Chinese)
        • S1: Chinese Room
          • I don't understand Chinese
          • In the middle of the room is:
            • boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base)
            • a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program)
          • People outside the room send in other Chinese symbols: questions in Chinese (the input)
          • By following the instructions in the program I pass the Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output)
          • I p-understand Chinese
          • So, I p-understand Chinese w/ understanding Chinese, which is (5)
      3. So, ~(1)
      4. The only thing a computer can do is p-understand
      5. So, a computer can't understand
      • R1: Systems Reply
        • I am not the whole system here, but more like the cpu of the computer
        • So, me not understanding is irrelevant
        • The system as a whole understands, and that's what counts
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Argument
          • Memorize the rules, then there's only one physical system
          • R1: Virtual Mind Reply
            • There is a virtual mind working the program
            • O1: there is only one physical system
      • R2: Robot reply
        • Include Ci-understanding
        • O1: Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Use digital readouts of cameras and this satisfies Ci-understanding without true understanding
      • R3: Brain Simulator Reply
        • Make a computer that takes natural-language as inputs and runs a program identical to a human brain that understands Chinese
        • Add X-understanding
        • O1: Supergenius Internalized Chinese Room Robot
          • Increase complexity of the Chinese Room program too
        • O2 (Searle): the water valve brain
      • R4: Other Minds
        1. We attribute understanding to other people because of their behavior
        2. Robots and aliens share the same behavior
        3. So, we should attribute understanding to robots and aliens
        • N1: this is R-understanding
        • S1: pragmatic reasons
          • O1: anthropomorphizing is useful, but metaphoric
      • R5: Intuition Reply
        1. The Chinese Room Argument is based on intuition
        2. Intuition is unreliable in metaphysics
        3. Computational Theory of Mind has explanatory power
        4. We should believe in things that have the most explanatory power
        5. So, we should trust Computational Theory of Mind over the Chinese Room Argument
        • O1: framing CRA in the first person appeals to observation, not intuition

Further Reading

The Liberalism Objection to Functionalism

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Functionalism is the idea that the thing that makes psychological discourse true is that there is something with the same functional organization as the mind, where the mind is understood as an abstract theory rather than a real thing. The Liberalism Objection claims that there are counterexamples to this idea. The most interesting counterexample is Ned Block's Chinese Brain thought experiment.

NOTES

  • Important presuppositions:
    1. Psychological physicalism
    2. Psychological discourse is true for humans
    3. MRT: Psychological discourse is true for a set of non-human things, too
    4. Psychological discourse is false or meaningless for the compliment of that set
  • Functionalism: the same functional organization
    • Definitions:
      • c-mind: common sense mind
        • what people typically mean by mind
        • not identical to the brain
      • f-mind: functionalist mind
        • anything that has the same functional organization as the c-mind
    1. (Psychological physicalism) The c-mind is fictional
    2. But, the fiction has a structure/functional organization to it
    3. The human brain has the same functional organization as the c-mind
    4. So, by definition, it has an f-mind
    5. When we use the word mind, we should mean f-mind
    6. So, humans have a mind
    • Arguments for (5)
      • A1: it's useful
        • We have certain goals as humans that we don't as sacks of atoms
      • O1 (Liberalism Objection): other things could realize that same functional organization that we wouldn’t say have a mind
        • S1: Chinese brain
        • R1: technically, it is a mind
          • O1: from pragmatic definition
            1. The word 'mind' was defined pragmatically
            2. For the same word to apply, it must be useful in the same way
            3. But, it would not be useful to identify the Chinese brain as having a mind
            4. If it's not useful to claim the Chinese brain has a mind, but it has an f-mind, then having an f-mind isn't sufficient for having a mind
          • O2: redefining words leads to confusion
      • O2: the headache

Further Reading

Eliminativism vs. Reductivism vs. Non-reductivism

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This video goes over the differences between eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism.

NOTES

  • eliminativism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is false.
  • reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is only true for things that share that physical makeup.
    • But, psychological discourse is reducible to physical discourse.
  • non-reductivism
    • Psychological physicalism- in philosophy of mind, only physical things exist.
    • Psychological discourse refers to non-specific physical things.
    • So, psychological discourse is true for anything.
    • Psychological discourse is not reducible to physical discourse.

Further Reading