The Philosurfer

Coextension Problem: Are coextensive properties a problem for class/resemblance nominalism?

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Class and resemblance nominalisms both claim that having a property is nothing more than being a member of a class, but classes are identical if coextensive, so that would mean properties would be identical if coextensive. Isn’t it possible to have two properties that are coextensive but not identical?

NOTES

Further Reading

Sophie Allen, "Properties: A Critical Introduction"

J.P. Moreland, "Universals"

Intuitionism: Is ‘good’ indefinable?

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Intuitionists think that you can't define 'good,' but that you can know basic moral truths through intuition.

NOTES

  • Good is indefinable
    • Some terms have to be this way
      • If every term were defined by other terms, then at least some would be defined in a circle
    • A1 (Moore)
      1. In a definition, the definiendum and definiens are interchangeable
      2. The definiendum 'good' is not interchangeable with any definiens
        • S1: it is always conceivable that the two are not the same
        • E.g., CR: "Good" = "socially acceptable"
          • Is it conceivable that a society accepts what's bad?
          • Yes, you could imagine them accepting anything, and something has to be bad
      3. So, 'good' is indefinable
  • Good is
    • objective
    • real
    • non-natural
  • Self-evident basic moral truths
    • Intuition
      • Not inference
        • A1: is-ought fallacy
          1. Moral reasoning must look like this:
            1. X is Y
            2. So, you ought to do X
            • E.g.,
              • Helping others is socially acceptable
              • So, you ought to help others
          3. This reasoning is invalid
            • It's always possible that (a) is true and (b) is false
          4. So, we can't know basic moral truths through inference
    • Doesn't mean you can't be wrong
      • Modus ponens is self-evident and obvious
      • Modus tollens isn't
        • If Pablo goes surfing, so will Queenie
        • Queenie doesn’t surf
        • Could Pablo go surfing?
        • If he did, then Queenie would go
        • But we just said she doesn't
      • Affirming the consequent seems self-evident, but is false
    • intuition
      • direct intellectual apprehension- we see it directly and can't be wrong
      • Alternatively, intellectual seeming- it seems to be a certain way to us, but that doesn't mean it is that way for sure
        • In the same way as perceptual seemings
  • O1: natures are discovered empirically
    • Water & H2O
    • R1: good is different
      • Concept of water is purely phenomenological, but concept of good isn't like that
  • O2: moral disagreement
    • Trolley problems
      • Switch
      • Fat man
      • Matters which order you hear them in
      • People disagree about answers
    • R1: agreement in the basics
      • Don't harm without cause
      • Just not sure in these cases what considerations outweigh which
      • O1: disagreement in basics
        • Maximize good consequences
        • Set of rules: don't kill fetuses, don't rape, etc.
  • O3: source of intuitions
    • Many moral intuitions come from society
      • See the burning widow video
    • R1: some are universal

Further Reading

G.E. Moore, "Principia Ethica"

W.D. Ross, "The Right and the Good"

H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics"

Harry J. Gensler, "Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction"