James F. Ross gives an argument that thinking must be a non-physical process because concepts are semantically determinate, whereas no physical thing is determinate.
NOTES
Argument from Semantic Determinacy of Thought
- There is a fact of the matter about what concepts mean
- There is no fact of the matter about what anything physical means
- So, concepts are not physical
- O1: our thoughts aren't determinate
- R1: self-defeating
- O2 (Peter Dillard): in computer science, there is a determinate difference between an and-gate, an or-gate
- R1: physically determinate, not semantically determinate
- O3: neuroscience shows connection between thought and brain
- R1: the physical is necessary, but not sufficient, for thought
Further Reading
Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden
Edward Feser, “Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought," https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf follow up blog post: https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html
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