Identity Theory of Mind

contingent identity- two things are conceptually distinct, but actually identical
Identity theory = the mind is contingently identical to the brain & is reducible to the brain
- A1 (J.J.C. Smart): Ockham's razor
  1. The world is consists of physical things
  2. The mind is a different kind of entity
  3. We should avoid positing different kinds of entities
  4. So, we shouldn't posit the mind
- - O1: it would be simpler to deny the existence of the physical instead of the mental
  - O2: simplicity isn't a good test for truth
  - O3: ontological simplicity sacrifices theoretical simplicity
- A2 (David Lewis): theory model of mind
  1. The mind is a theory to explain behavior
  2. The brain is a theory to explain behavior
  3. Causal completeness principle favors brain theory
    - A1: inductive generalization from past scientific success implies physicalism
      - O1: inductive arguments can't be used to disprove the existence of entities
    - A2: conservation laws of physics
      - O1: hylomorphism doesn't violate conservation laws
      - O2: natural laws are descriptive, not prescriptive
    - A3: methodological presupposition
      - O1: unnecessary presupposition
  4. So, brain theory trumps mind theory
- - O1: the existence of a mind isn't a theory, but a datum of experience

For Smart's use of Ockham's Razor, see his ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ in Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156 (1959)

For Lewis' argument, see ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25 (1966).

For more on David Hume's view of causation, read his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

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