Why does God allow evil? The Free Will Defense argues that it is a necessary consequence of free will, and that free will is worth the evil we suffer. Is this a sufficient reason? And is it possible to have free will without evil?
NOTES
The Problem of Evil
- 1. If God exists, He could prevent evil
- S1: all-powerful & all-knowing
- 2. If God exists, He would prevent evil
- S1: all-good
- So, 3. If God exists, evil doesn’t exist
- 4. Evil exists
- So, 5. God doesn’t exist
The Free Will Defense
- 1. We have free will
- 2. Evil is a necessary consequence of free will
- O1: free will without consequences
- S1: God could have made our brains such that we can make free will decisions to do the right thing, but every time we choose to do the wrong thing our brains stop us
- R1: no consequences = no personal growth
- R2: free will violation
- O2: free will agents who don’t sin
- 1. It is possible that no free will agent does evil
- S1: we are only morally responsible for things that are possible for us, so anytime it is impossible for us not to make a choice, it can’t be a moral choice, and therefore it can’t be an evil choice
- 2. God can create anything that is possible
- S1: all-knowing and all-powerful
- 3. Therefore, God could have made a world in which no free will agent does evil
- R1 (Open Theism): free will decisions known ahead of time are determined, and therefore not free will
- O1: they are determined by the agent, which is exactly free will
- R2 (Molinism): there isn’t a possible world where no agents sin
- O1: special pleading
- N1: the limits of this objection
- This doesn’t show God doesn’t allow some evil for the sake of our free will
- It only shows God didn’t need to use evil as a means to an end: the good end of free will
- Imagine I make the evil choice to steal a cupcake
- God might have allowed the evil because it is good that I have free will even if it is bad that I steal
- But, God also could have actualized the possible world in which I don’t steal the cupcake
- So, there is a further question as to why God would actualize the cupcake-stealing world vs. the non-cupcake-stealing world
- But, in the cupcake-stealing world, it’s still true that it was good for me to have free will even though I used it for villainy
- 1. It is possible that no free will agent does evil
- O3: evils that can’t be explained by free will
- S1: natural evils involve no free will choices (e.g., earthquakes, cancer)
- Sometimes natural evils and free will evils are intertwined, like when companies push smoking on kids (free will evil) knowing that it causes cancer (natural evil)
- But, there are also natural evils that have nothing to do with free will evils, like natural disasters that aren’t the result of climate change or anything like that
- S2: evils suffered by people other than the free will agent
- 1. The good of having free will is enjoyed by the free will agent
- 2. But, the evil suffered is often suffered by someone other than the free will agent
- 3. So, the good of one person is at the expense of another, which seems unfair
- R1: Fallen World Theory
- 1. The world began without any natural evils or evils suffered by people other than the free will agent
- 2. Someone used their free will choice to do something evil: the Original Sin
- 3. This Original Sin corrupted the world so that natural evils and evils suffered by people other than the free will agent would occur
- 4. So, all of these evils are consequences of an original free will evil, the Original Sin
- 5. The potential for the evil of the Original Sin was a necessary consequence of free will
- 6. So, all evil, including natural evils and those suffered by people other than the free will agent, are the necessary consequence of free will
- O1: the corruptibility of the world may have been a consequence of the Original Sin, but it wasn’t a necessary consequence, so these aren’t necessary consequences of Original Sin
- S1: God could have made a world that doesn’t get corrupted into having natural evils when an original sin happens
- S2: God could have put us in an isolated world with things that perfectly resemble people (e.g., a computer simulation or robots that are indistinguishable from humans) so that our free will choices don’t affect anyone else
- S1: natural evils involve no free will choices (e.g., earthquakes, cancer)
- 3. Free will is worth the evil
- A1: most people wouldn’t give up their free will to avoid evil
- A2: many things we value that require free will seem worth the evil
- S1: heroism
- O1: free will without consequences
Important notes
- If the Free Will Defense fails, that doesn’t mean the Problem of Evil succeeds
- S1: premise (2) remains unmotivated because God isn’t a moral agent like ourselves so that we can predict everything He would do
- S2: there are possible other reasons for God to allow evil
- If the Free Will Defense fails, free will might still explain why God allows some evils, just not all evils
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